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Abstract—In symbolic verification of security protocols, pro-
cess equivalences have recently been used extensively to model
strong secrecy, anonymity and unlinkability properties. However,
tool support for automated analysis of equivalence properties is
limited compared to trace properties, e.g., modeling authentica-
tion and weak notions of secrecy. In this paper, we present a
novel procedure for verifying equivalences on finite processes,
i.e., without replication, for protocols that rely on various
cryptographic primitives including exclusive or (xor). We have
implemented our procedure in the tool AKISS, and successfully
used it on several case studies that are outside the scope of
existing tools, e.g., unlinkability on various RFID protocols, and
resistance against guessing attacks on protocols that use xor.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting authenticity and confidentiality of transactions by
the use of cryptography has become standard practice. Security
protocols such as TLS, SSH, or Kerberos are nowadays widely
deployed. However, history has shown that designing secure
protocols is challenging, because of the concurrent execution
of protocols in an adversarial environment. Many attacks
exploit flaws in the protocol logic rather than, or sometimes
combined with, weaknesses in the underlying cryptographic
primitives, e.g., [13]. During the past two decades, several
efficient automated verification tools have been developed to
detect logical flaws, e.g., ProVerif [16], AVISPA [6], Maude-
NPA [28], Tamarin [38], and they have successfully discovered
many attacks in academic protocols [34], standards [10] and
deployed protocols [5].
Authentication and (weak forms of) confidentiality are mod-
elled as trace properties: they are checked by verifying that
each possible trace of the system satisfies some predicate. The
verification of such properties is nowadays well understood
and enjoys efficient tool support, as discussed above. However,
some properties such as resistance against guessing attacks,
strong secrecy, anonymity and unlinkability [24], [27], [4],
[17] are expressed in terms of indistinguishability, a form of
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process equivalence [2], [1]. Automated verification of equiv-
alence properties is not yet as mature as for trace properties.
Several tools have recently been extended with the possibility
to verify a strong equivalence called diff-equivalence [15],
[11], [37]. This equivalence can only relate processes that only
differ in the messages that they use, but not in their control
flow, which is too strong for some applications. Dedicated
tools for verifying process equivalences on security protocols,
in the case of a bounded number of sessions, have also
been developed. The SPEC tool [39] decides a symbolic
bisimulation, which implies trace equivalence, for protocols
that use a fixed set of standard cryptographic primitives. It
does not support protocols with else branches. The APTE
tool [19] decides trace equivalence for processes including else
branches, and a fixed set of standard primitives. The AKISS
tool [18] is able to check trace equivalence for processes
without else branches but supports various cryptographic prim-
itives, including most standard ones as well as, e.g., blind
signatures and trapdoor bit commitment.
Some protocols use cryptographic primitives that have al-
gebraic properties [25]. Exclusive or (xor) is such a primitive,
and protocols implemented on low-power devices, such as
RFID tags, often rely on it because of its computational effi-
ciency [41]. There exist many results for taking into account
algebraic properties for trace based properties, in particular
for the xor operator [23], [21], [33]. However, only a few
procedures for equivalence properties take algebraic properties
into account. Delaune et al. [26] have studied equivalence
of constraint systems, showing in particular that the theory
for xor is decidable in PTIME. However, they only consider
the case of pure group theories, not allowing any other
equations, e.g., those modelling encryption. When considering
an unbounded number of sessions, tools that can verify diff-
equivalence do not effectively support xor. The Tamarin tool
supports a theory for Diffie-Hellman exponentiations, but not
xor. The Maude-NPA tool supports xor in principle, but when
verifying equivalence properties it does not terminate even
on simple examples. For trace properties such as secrecy and
authentication, termination is achieved in practice on several
examples, e.g., a xor based variant of the NSL protocol, the
IBM CCA crypto API: sometimes, attacks are discovered
by bounding the search depth to avoid non-termination; the
analysis of CCA also relies on Never Patterns, a technique
that allows to prune the search space, but which requires an
external, protocol-dependent [32] justification.
AKISS in a nutshell: The procedure that we present in
this paper builds on previous work by Chadha et al. [18],
and its implementation in the AKISS tool. This tool checks
equivalences for protocols modelled as processes in a calculus
similar to the applied pi-calculus [1], but without else branches
nor replication. It actually checks for two equivalences which
over- and under-approximate the standard notion of trace
equivalence for cryptographic protocols, allowing one to either
prove or disprove trace equivalence. The coarser equivalence
also coincides with trace equivalence on the large class of
determinate processes.
The AKISS tool supports cryptographic primitives that can
be expressed through a convergent rewrite system enjoying
the finite variant property [22]. Termination is guaranteed for
the subclass of subterm convergent rewrite theories, but also
achieved in practice on several examples outside this class.
The procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of
symbolic traces of the protocols into first-order Horn clauses.
Each symbolic trace is translated into a set of clauses called
seed statements, and a dedicated resolution procedure is ap-
plied to this set to construct a set of statements that have a
simple form, called solved statements. It is shown that these
solved statements form a sound and complete representation
of the symbolic trace under study. Therefore, only the set
of solved statements is required to decide whether a given
symbolic trace is included in some process. To decide trace
equivalence between processes P and Q, the procedure checks
whether each symbolic trace of P is included in Q as described
above, and vice versa.
Contributions: We design a new procedure for verifying
trace equivalence of protocols that use the xor operator,
extending the work by Chadha et al. [18]. Our procedure
follows the general structure of the original one, modelling
protocols as processes in (a variant of the) applied pi-calculus
(Section II) and translating symbolic traces into Horn clauses
(Section III). The xor operator is not supported in AKISS
because it cannot be modelled by a convergent rewrite system.
Our approach consists in first orienting the equations of
xor into a convergent rewrite system modulo associativity
and commutativity (AC), then generalizing the procedure of
Chadha et al. to reason modulo AC (Section IV). A direct
generalisation would be sound and complete, but would not
terminate even on very simple examples. We therefore com-
pletely redesign the resolution procedure, using a new strategy
to forbid certain steps that would yield non-termination. Show-
ing that these steps are indeed unnecessary requires essential
changes to the completeness proof. The modified procedure
yields an effective algorithm for checking trace equivalence
(Section V). Although termination is not guaranteed, we have
implemented our procedure as an extension of AKISS and
demonstrated its effectiveness on several examples, including
unlinkability for various RFID protocols [41] and resistance
against guessing attacks for password based protocols [30],
[31]. To the best of our knowledge, our tool is the first that
can effectively verify equivalence properties for protocols that
use xor. As with all of the above-mentionned tools, our results
are restricted to the (symbolic) model under consideration:
when our algorithm concludes that there is no attack, it is
only meaningful in that model. A proof in the computational
model would be stronger, but would still bear some limitations.
A natural question is whether our symbolic model could be
computationally sound. Note that the impossibily result of [40]
does not apply here, since we only consider bounded runs.
Nevertheless, we do not claim computational soundness, and
argue instead that symbolic security proofs are already useful
information.
Outline: In Section II, we introduce our formalism for
modelling protocols, a variant of the replication-free fragment
of the applied pi calculus. In Section III, we provide a fully
abstract representation in Horn clauses of protocols expressed
in our calculus. Next, we present our saturation procedure
based on Horn clause resolution in Section IV. We present the
algorithm for checking trace equivalence, its implementation,
and our case studies in Section V.
II. PROCESS CALCULUS
We introduce the process calculus and the notion of equiva-
lence that we use to model protocols and indistinguishability.
Our calculus has similarities with the applied pi-calculus [1]
which has been extensively used to specify security protocols.
Participants in a protocol are modeled as processes, and
the communication between them is modeled by means of
message passing.
A. Term algebra
As usual in symbolic models we model messages as terms.
We consider several sets of atomic terms:
• N is a set of names, partitioned into the disjoint sets Nprv
and Npub of private and public names;
• X is the set of message variables, denoted x, y, etc.;
• W = {w1,w2, . . .} is the set of parameters.
Intuitively, private names in Nprv represent nonces or keys
generated by honest participants, while public names in Npub
represent identifiers available both to the attacker and to honest
participants, and attacker nonces. Parameters are used by the
attacker as pointers to refer to messages that were previously
output by the protocol participants.
Given a signature Σ (i.e., a finite set of function symbols
together with their arity) and a set of atoms A we denote
by T (Σ,A) the set of terms, defined as the smallest set that
contains A and that is closed under application of function
symbols in Σ. We denote by vars(t) the set of variables oc-
curring in a term t. As usual, a substitution is a function from
variables to terms, that is lifted to terms homomorphically. The
application of a substitution σ to a term u is written uσ, and we
denote dom(σ) its domain, i.e. dom(σ) = {x | σ(x) 6= x}.
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The identity substitution, of empty domain, is noted ∅. The
positions of a term are defined as usual.
We associate an equational theory E to the signature Σ.
It consists of a finite set of equations of the form M = N
where M,N ∈ T (Σ,X ), and induces an equivalence relation
over terms: =E is the smallest congruence on terms, which
contains all equations M = N in E, and that is closed under
substitution of terms for variables. To model protocols that
only rely on the xor operator, we consider Σxor = {⊕, 0}, and
the equational theory Exor below:
x⊕ x = 0 x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x⊕ y)⊕ z
x⊕ 0 = x x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
We denote by AC the equational theory defined by the
two equations on the right. We may also want to consider
additional primitives, e.g. pairs, symmetric and asymmetric
encryptions, signatures, hashes, etc. This can be done by
extending the signature as well as the equational theory.
Example 1: Let Σ+xor = Σxor ] {〈·, ·〉, proj1, proj2, h}, and
consider the equational theory E+xor extending Exor with the
equations proj1(〈x, y〉) = x, and proj2(〈x, y〉) = y. The
symbol 〈·, ·〉 models pairs; the proji symbols model projec-
tions; the unary symbol h models a hash function. Take id ∈
Npub to model the identity of a participant, and r1, r2, k ∈ Nprv
to represent two random numbers and a key, a priori unknown
to the attacker. Let t0 = 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉) ⊕ r2〉. We have
that (proj1(t0)⊕ id)⊕ proj2(t0) =E+xor h(〈r1, k〉).
In this paper we consider a signature Σ such that Σxor ⊆ Σ,
together with an equational theory generated by a set of
equations of the form
E = Exor ∪ {M = N | M,N ∈ T (Σ r Σxor,X )}.
Hence, E models xor in combination with any other equational
theory that is disjoint from Exor.
B. Finite variant property
A rewrite system R is a set of rewrite rules of the form
`→ r where `, r ∈ T (Σ,X ), and vars(r) ⊆ vars(`). A
term t can be rewritten in one step (modulo AC) to u,
denoted t→R,AC u, if there exists a position p in term t, a
rule ` → r in R and a substitution σ such that t|p =AC `σ
and u = t[rσ]p, i.e., the term at position p in t is equal to
`σ modulo AC and u is the term obtained by replacing, in
t, the subterm t|p with rσ. The relation →∗R,AC denotes the
transitive and reflexive closure of →R,AC.
A rewrite system R is AC-convergent if the relation→∗R,AC
is confluent and strongly terminating. We denote by t↓R,AC (or
simply t↓) the normal form of a term t. In the following we
only consider equational theories E that can be represented by
a rewrite system R which is AC-convergent, i.e., such that
u =E v ⇔ u↓R,AC =AC v↓R,AC.
Example 2: The equational theory E+xor of Example 1 can
be represented by the following AC-convergent system:
R+xor =
 x⊕ (x⊕ y)→ yx⊕ 0→ x
x⊕ x→ 0
proj1(〈x, y〉)→ x
proj2(〈x, y〉)→ y
Let t0 = 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2〉. We have that:
proj1(t0)⊕ proj2(t0)
→R+xor,AC (id ⊕ r2)⊕ proj2(t0)
→R+xor,AC (id ⊕ r2)⊕ (h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2)
→R+xor,AC id ⊕ h(〈r1, k〉)
Note that the first rule in R+xor is essential in last rewriting
step above, and more generally for R+xor to represent Exor.
Given an AC-convergent rewrite system R, we define com-
plete sets of variants, first introduced in [22].
Definition 1: Consider a rewrite system R that is AC-
convergent, and a set of terms T . A set of substitutions
variantsR,AC(T ) is called a complete set of variants for
the set of terms T , if for any substitution ω there exist
σ ∈ variantsR,AC(T ), and a substitution τ such that:
• xω↓ =AC xσ↓τ for any x ∈ vars(T ), and
• (tω)↓ =AC (tσ)↓τ for any t ∈ T .
The set of variants of t represents a pre-computation such
that the normal form of any instance of t is equal (mod-
ulo AC) to an instance of tσ↓ for some σ in the set of
variants, without the need to apply further rewrite steps. A
rewrite system has the finite variant property if for any set
of terms one can compute a finite complete set of vari-
ants. We will often write variantsR,AC(t1, . . . , tn) instead of
variantsR,AC({t1, . . . , tn}).
Example 3: Considering the equational theory E+xor in-
troduced in Example 1, and the rewrite system defined
in Example 2. We have σ = {x 7→ 〈x1, x2〉} ∈
variantsR,AC(proj1(x)). Actually, σ together with the identity
substitution form a complete set of variants for proj1(x).
The following substitutions, together with the identity sub-
stitution, form a complete set of variants for x⊕ y:
• σ1 = {x 7→ y ⊕ z}, σ′1 = {y 7→ x⊕ z},
• σ2 = {x 7→ x′ ⊕ z, y 7→ y′ ⊕ z},
• σ3 = {y 7→ x}, and
• σ4 = {x 7→ 0}, σ′4 = {y 7→ 0}.
This finite variant property is satisfied by many equational
theories of interest, e.g., symmetric and asymmetric encryp-
tions, signatures, blind signatures, zero-knowledge proofs.
Moreover, such a property plays an important role regarding
equational unification. It implies the existence of a complete
set of unifiers, and gives us a way to compute it effec-
tively [29].
Definition 2: Consider an AC-convergent R and a set
of equations Γ = {u1 = v1, . . . , uk = vk}. A set of
substitutions S is a complete set of R,AC-unifiers for Γ if:
1) for each σ ∈ S and i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, uiσ↓ =AC viσ↓;
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READER
k, id
TAG
k, id
nonce r1 r1
nonce r2
〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2〉
id ⊕ (id ⊕ r2)⊕ (h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2)
?
= h(〈r1, k〉)
Fig. 1: The KCL protocol
2) for each θ such that uiθ↓ =AC viθ↓ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
there exists σ ∈ S and a substitution τ such that xθ↓ =AC
xστ↓ for any x ∈ vars(Γ).
Such a set is denoted csuR,AC(Γ), or csuAC(Γ) when R = ∅.
C. Process calculus
Let Ch be a set of public channels. A protocol is modeled by
a finite set of processes generated by the following grammar:
P, P ′, P1, P2 ::= 0 null process
in(c, x).P input
out(c, t).P output
[s = t].P test
where x ∈ X , s, t ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X ), and c ∈ Ch.
As usual, a receive action in(c, x) acts as a binding construct
for the variable x. We assume the usual definitions of free
and bound variables for processes. We also assume that each
variable is bound at most once. A process is ground if it does
not contain any free variables. For sake of conciseness, we
sometimes omit the null process at the end of a process.
Following [18], we only consider a minimalistic core calcu-
lus that does not include parallel composition. Given that we
only consider a bounded number of sessions (i.e., a process
calculus without replication) and that we aim at verifying trace
equivalence, parallel composition can be added as syntactic
sugar to denote the set of all interleavings [18]. Therefore, in
this paper, a protocol is simply a finite set of ground processes.
Example 4: Following a description given in [41], we
consider the RFID protocol depicted in Figure 1. The reader
and the tag id share the secret key k. The reader starts by
sending a nonce r1. The tag generates a nonce r2 and computes
the message t0 = 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉) ⊕ r2〉 introduced in
Example 1. When receiving such a message, the reader will
be able to retrieve r2 from the first component, and by xoring
it with the second component, he obtains h(〈r1, k〉).
Using our formalism, we can model the two roles of this
protocol with the following ground processes:
Ptag = in(c, x). out(c, 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈x, k〉)⊕ r2〉). 0
Preader = out(c, r1). in(c, y).
[(proj1(y)⊕ id)⊕ proj2(y) = h(〈r1, k〉)]. 0
where r1, r2, k ∈ Nprv, id ∈ Npub, and x, y ∈ X . The protocol
itself corresponds to the set of ground processes obtained by
interleaving these two roles.
The aim of this protocol is not only to authenticate the tag
but also to ensure its unlinkability. An attacker should not
be able to observe whether he has seen the same tag twice
or two different tags. We will formalize this later on, relying
on a notion of trace equivalence, and we will show that this
protocol fails to achieve this unlinkability property.
To define the semantics of our calculus, we introduce the
notion of deducibility. At a particular point in time, after
some interaction with a protocol, an attacker may know a
sequence of messages t1, . . . , t` ∈ T (Σ,N ). Such a sequence
is organised into a frame ϕ = {w1 7→ t1, . . . ,w` 7→ t`} that
is a substitution of size |ϕ| = `.
Definition 3: Let ϕ be a frame, t ∈ T (Σ,N ) and R ∈
T (Σ,Npub ∪ dom(ϕ)). We say that t is deducible from ϕ
using R, written ϕ `R t, when Rϕ↓ =AC t↓.
Intuitively, an attacker is able to deduce new messages by
applying function symbols in Σ to names in Npub and terms
stored in ϕ. The term R is called a recipe.
Example 5: Continuing Example 4, consider the frame
ϕ = {w1 7→ r1, w2 7→ 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2〉}.
We have that h(〈r1, k〉) is deducible from ϕ using the recipe
R = (proj1(w2)⊕ proj2(w2))⊕ id .
We now define the semantics of our process calculus by
means of a labelled transition relation on configurations. A
configuration is a pair (P,ϕ) where P is a ground process,
and ϕ is a frame used to record the messages that the
participants have sent previously.
The relation `−→ where ` is either an input, an output, or an
unobservable action test is defined as follows:
RECV (in(c, x).P, ϕ)
in(c,R)−−−−→ (P{x 7→ t↓}, ϕ) if ϕ `R t
SEND (out(c, t).P, ϕ)
out(c)−−−→ (P,ϕ ∪ {w|ϕ|+1 7→ t↓})
TEST ([s = t].P, ϕ) test−−→ (P,ϕ) if s↓ =AC t↓
The label in(c,R) indicates the input of a message sent by
the attacker over the channel c where R is the recipe that
the attacker uses to construct this message. The label out(c)
indicates a message sent over channel c, and transition rule
SEND records the message sent in the frame. Finally, the rule
TEST checks equality of s and t in the equational theory and
is labelled by the unobservable action test.
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(Pdiff, ∅)
in(c,r1)−−−−→ (out(c, 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2〉).P ′tag, ∅)
out(c)−−−→ (P ′tag, {w1 7→ 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2〉})
in(c,r1)−−−−→ (out(c, 〈id ′ ⊕ r′2, h(〈r1, k′〉)⊕ r′2〉).0, {w1 7→ 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2〉})
out(c)−−−→ (0, {w1 7→ 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2〉, w2 7→ 〈id ′ ⊕ r′2, h(〈r1, k′〉)⊕ r′2〉})
(Psame, ∅)
in(c,r1),out(c),in(c,r1),out(c)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (0, {w1 7→ 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2〉, w2 7→ 〈id ⊕ r′2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r′2〉})
Fig. 2: Some derivations (see Example 6)
Example 6: Consider the ground process Pdiff that models
an execution of the tag id (who shares the key k with the
reader) followed by an execution of the tag id ′ (who shares
the key k′ with the reader), i.e., Pdiff = Ptag.P ′tag where:
Ptag = in(c, x).out(c, 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈x, k〉)⊕ r2〉)
P ′tag = in(c, x′).out(c, 〈id
′ ⊕ r′2, h(〈x′, k′〉)⊕ r′2〉)
We also consider the ground process Psame obtained from Pdiff
by replacing the occurrence of id ′ (resp. k′) by id (resp. k)
(but keeping the nonce r′2). This process models an execution
of two instances of the protocol by the same tag id (who shares
the key k with the reader). Following our semantics, we have
the derivations described in Figure 2 where r1 ∈ Npub, i.e. r1
is a public name known by the attacker.
When ` 6= test we define `=⇒ to be test−−→
∗ `−→ test−−→
∗
and we
lift `−→ and `=⇒ to sequences of actions. Given a protocol P ,
we write (P, ϕ) `1,...,`n−−−−−→ (P ′, ϕ′) if there exists P ∈ P such
that (P,ϕ)
`1,...,`n−−−−−→ (P ′, ϕ′), and similarly for `=⇒.
D. Process equivalence
In order to define our notion of equivalence, we first define
what it means for a test to hold on a frame.
Definition 4: Let ϕ be a frame and R1, R2 be two terms in
T (Σ,Npub ∪ dom(ϕ)). The test R1
?
= R2 holds on frame ϕ,
written (R1 = R2)ϕ, if R1ϕ↓ =AC R2ϕ↓.
Example 7: Consider the frames ϕdiff = {w1 7→ t,w2 7→ t′}
and ϕsame = {w1 7→ t,w2 7→ t′′} where the terms t, t′, and
t′′ are as follows:
• t = 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r2〉,
• t′ = 〈id ′ ⊕ r′2, h(〈r1, k′〉)⊕ r′2〉,
• t′′ = 〈id ⊕ r′2, h(〈r1, k〉)⊕ r′2〉.
They correspond to the frames obtained at the end of the
executions considered in Example 6. The test
proj1(w1)⊕ proj2(w1)
?
= proj1(w2)⊕ proj2(w2)
holds in ϕsame but not in ϕdiff. An attacker can xor the
two components of each message and check whether this
computation yields an equality or not.
Definition 5: A protocol P is trace included in a protocol
Q, denoted P v Q, if whenever (P, ∅) `1,...,`n=====⇒ (P,ϕ) and
(R1 = R2)ϕ, then there exists a configuration (Q′, ϕ′) such
that (Q, ∅) `1,...,`n=====⇒ (Q′, ϕ′) and (R1 = R2)ϕ′. We say that P
and Q are equivalent, written P ≈ Q, if P v Q and Q v P .
This notion of equivalence does not coincide with the usual
notion of trace equivalence as defined e.g. in [20]. It is actually
coarser and is therefore sound for finding attacks. Moreover,
it has been shown that the two notions coincide for the class
of determinate processes [18].
Definition 6: We say that a protocol P is determinate if
whenever (P, ∅) `1,...,`n=====⇒ (P,ϕ), and (P, ∅) `1,...,`n=====⇒ (P ′, ϕ′),
then for any test R1
?
= R2, we have that: (R1 = R2)ϕ if, and
only if (R1 = R2)ϕ′.
In general, checking determinacy is as difficult as checking
equivalence. However, it is typically ensured easily in practice:
for instance, any protocol whose roles have a deterministic
behaviour can be modeled as a determinate process using
a different channel for each role. In case processes are not
determinate, the above relation can be used to disprove trace
equivalence, i.e., find attacks. It is also possible to check a
more fine-grained notion of trace equivalence which implies
the usual notion of trace equivalence. This fine-grained notion
can be verified straightforwardly by using the algorithm for
verifying the above defined (coarse-grained) trace equivalence
in a black-box manner, cf. [18] for details.
Example 8: Going back to our running example, we
have that Psame = {Psame} and Pdiff = {Pdiff} are not
in equivalence according to our definition (as well as the
usual notion of trace equivalence since these two protocols
are determinate). More precisely, we have that Psame 6v Pdiff.
Indeed, we have shown that:
• (Psame, ∅)
in(c,r1),out(c),in(c,r1),out(c)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (0, ϕsame); and
• (proj1(w1)⊕ proj2(w1)=proj1(w2)⊕ proj2(w2))ϕsame.
However, the only extended trace (P ′, ϕ′) such that
(Pdiff, ∅)
in(c,r1),out(c),in(c,r1),out(c)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (P ′, ϕ′)
is (0, ϕdiff) and we have seen that proj1(w1) ⊕ proj2(w1)
?
=
proj1(w2)⊕ proj2(w2) does not hold in ϕdiff (see Example 7).
However, we have that Pdiff v Psame. This is a non trivial
inclusion that has been checked using our tool.
III. MODELLING USING HORN CLAUSES
Our procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of a
process in first-order Horn clauses.
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(P0, ϕ0) |= r`1,...,`n if (P0, ϕ0)
L1−−→ (P1, ϕ1) . . .
Ln−−→ (Pn, ϕn) such that `i↓ =AC Liϕi−1↓ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(P0, ϕ0) |= k`1,...,`n(R, t) if when (P0, ϕ0)
L1−−→ (P1, ϕ1)
L2−−→ . . . Ln−−→ (Pn, ϕn)
such that `i↓ =AC Liϕi−1↓ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then ϕn `R t
(P0, ϕ0) |= i`1,...,`n(R,R′) if there exists t such that (P0, ϕ0) |= k`1,...,`n(R, t) and (P0, ϕ0) |= k`1,...,`n(R′, t)
(P0, ϕ0) |= ri`1,...,`n(R,R′) if (P0, ϕ0) |= r`1,...,`n and (P0, ϕ0) |= i`1,...,`n(R,R′)
Fig. 3: Semantics of atomic formulas
A. Predicates
We define symbolic runs, denoted u, v, w, as finite se-
quences of symbolic labels
` ∈ {in(c, t), out(c), test | t ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X ), c ∈ Ch}.
The empty sequence is denoted ε. Intuitively, a symbolic run
stands for a set of possible runs of the protocol. We denote
u vAC v when u is a prefix (modulo AC) of v.
We assume a set Y of recipe variables disjoint from X ,
and we use capital letters X,Y, Z to range over Y . We
assume that such variables may only be substituted by terms
in T (Σ,Npub∪W∪Y). Our logic is based on four predicates,
whose semantics is given in Figure 3, where w denotes a
symbolic run, R,R′ are terms in T (Σ,Npub ∪W ∪Y), and t
is a term in T (Σ,N ∪ X ). Intuitively:
• reachability predicate: rw holds when the run represented
by w is executable;
• intruder knowledge predicate: kw(R, t) holds if whenever
the run represented by w is executable, the message t can
be constructed by the intruder using the recipe R;
• identity predicate: iw(R,R′) holds if whenever the run w
is executable, R and R′ are recipes for the same term;
and
• reachable identity predicate: riw(R,R′) is a shortcut for
rw ∧ iw(R,R′).
A (ground) atomic formula is interpreted over a pair con-
sisting of a process P and a frame ϕ, and we write (P,ϕ) |= f
when the atomic formula f holds for (P,ϕ) or simply P |= f
when ϕ is the empty frame. We consider first-order formulas
built from the above atomic formulas using conjunction,
implication and universal quantification. The semantics is as
expected, but the domain of quantified variables depends on
their type: variables in X may be mapped to any term in
T (Σ,N ), while recipe variables in Y are mapped to recipes,
i.e. terms in T (Σ,Npub ∪W).
Example 9: Continuing our running example, let w =
in(c, r1), out(c), in(c, r1), out(c), t0 = id ⊕ h(〈r1, k〉), and
Ri = proj1(wi)⊕ proj2(wi) with i ∈ {1, 2}. We have that:
(Psame, ∅) |= rw ∧ kw(R1, t0) ∧ kw(R2, t0) ∧ riw(R1, R2).
Consider t = 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈x, k〉)⊕ r2〉 and the formulas
• f1 = ∀X,x. rin(c,x),out(c) ⇐ kε(X,x);
• f2 = ∀X,x. kin(c,x),out(c)(w1, t)⇐ kε(X,x).
We have that Psame |= f1 and Psame |= f2.
B. Seed statements
We shall be mainly concerned with particular forms of Horn
clauses which we call statements.
Definition 7: A statement is a Horn clause of the form
H ⇐ ku1(X1, t1), . . . , kun(Xn, tn) where:
• H ∈ {ru0 , ku0(R, t), iu0(R,R′), riu0(R,R′)};
• u0, u1, . . . , un are symbolic runs such that ui vAC u0 for
any i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
• t, t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X );
• R,R′ ∈ T (Σ,Npub ∪W ∪ Y); and
• X1, . . . , Xn are distinct variables from Y .
Lastly, vars(t) ⊆ vars(t1, . . . , tn) when H = ku0(R, t).
In the above definition, we implicitly assume that all vari-
ables are universally quantified, i.e., all statements are ground.
By abuse of language we sometimes call σ a grounding
substitution for a statement H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn when σ is
grounding for each of the atomic formulas H,B1, . . . , Bn. The
skeleton of a statement f , denoted skel(f), is the statement
where recipes are removed.
r`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓ ⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈R(m)
for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n
for all σ ∈ csuR,AC({sk = tk}k∈T (m))
for all τ ∈ variantsR,AC(`1σ, . . . , `mσ)
k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|S(m)|, tmστ↓)⇐
{k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈R(m)
for all m ∈ S(n)
for all σ ∈ csuR,AC({sk = tk}k∈T (m))
for all τ ∈ variantsR,AC(`1σ, . . . , `mσ, tmσ)
kε(c, c)⇐
for all public names c ∈ N 0pub
k`1,...,`m(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓)⇐
{k`1,...,`m(Yj , yjτ↓)}j∈{1,...,k}
for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n
for all function symbols f of arity k
for all τ ∈ variantsR,AC(f(y1, . . . , yk)).
Fig. 4: Seed statements
As mentioned earlier, our decision procedure is based on
a fully abstract modelling of a process in first-order Horn
clauses. In this section, given a ground process P we will
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f+0 : kw(X1 ⊕X2, x1 ⊕ x2)⇐ kw(X1, x1), kw(X2, x2)
f+1 : kw(X1 ⊕X2, x1)⇐ kw(X1, x1 ⊕ x2), kw(X2, x2)
f+2 : kw(X1 ⊕X2, x1 ⊕ x2)⇐
kw(X1, x1 ⊕ x3), kw(X2, x2 ⊕ x3)
f+3 : kw(X1 ⊕X2, 0)⇐ kw(X1, x), kw(X2, x)
f+4 : kw(X1 ⊕X2, x)⇐ kw(X1, x), kw(X2, 0)
where w = `1, . . . , `m is as defined in Section III-B.
Fig. 5: Definition of f+0 and its variants.
give a set of statements seed(P ) which will serve as a starting
point for the modelling. We shall also establish that the set
of statements seed(P ) is a sound and (partially) complete
abstraction of the ground process P . In order to formally
define seed(P ), we start by fixing some conventions.
Let P = a1.a2. . . . .an be a ground process. We assume
w.l.o.g. the following naming conventions:
1) if ai is a receive action then ai = `i = in(ci, xi);
2) if ai is a send action then ai = out(ci, ti), `i = out(ci);
3) if ai is a test actions then ai = [si = ti], and `i = test.
Moreover, we assume that xi 6= xj for any i 6= j.
For each 0 ≤ m ≤ n, let the sets R(m), S(m) and T (m)
respectively denote the set of indices of the receive, send and
test actions amongst a1, . . . , am. Moreover, we denote by |S|
the number of elements in such a set. Formally,
• R(m) = { i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and ai = in(ci, xi) };
• S(m) = { i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and ai = out(ci, ti) };
• T (m) = { i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and ai = [si = ti] }.
Given a set of public names N 0pub ⊆ Npub, the set of seed
statements associated to P and N 0pub, denoted seed(P,N 0pub),
is defined in Figure 4. We may note that while constructing
the set of seed statements, we compute a complete set of
unifiers modulo the whole equational theory E w.r.t. all tests.
In addition, we also apply finite variants. This allows us to get
rid of the rewriting theory in the remainder of our procedure.
The first kind of seed statement models the fact that the run
represented by `1στ↓, . . . , `mστ↓ is executable as soon as the
attacker is able to feed each input with terms that will allow
one to successfully pass all the tests. Following the same idea,
under the same hypotheses, the attacker will be able to learn
the output term. The two last families of statements model
the deduction capabilities of the attacker who knows all the
public names, and is able to apply a function symbol on top of
terms that he already knows. These abilities can be used at any
stage. However, since we will give the attacker the abilities to
transfer his knowledge, we only have to express the fact that
he knows public names initially.
If N 0pub = Npub, then seed(P,Npub) is said to be the set
of seed statements associated to P and in this case we write
seed(P ) as a shortcut for seed(P,Npub).
Example 10: Continuing our running example, let
• u = in(c, x).out(c), v = in(c, x′).out(c);
• t = 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈x, k〉)⊕ r2〉;
• t′ = 〈id ⊕ r2, h(〈x′, k〉)⊕ r2〉.
The following statements belong to seed(Psame):
ru ⇐ kε(X,x) ruv ⇐ kw(X ′, x′), kε(X,x)
ku(w1, t)⇐ kε(X,x) kuv(w2, t′)⇐ kw(X ′, x′), kε(X,x)
When considering the last kind of statements in Figure 4 with
f = proj1 and the empty run, we obtain:
kε(proj1(X), proj1(x)) ⇐ kε(X,x)
kε(proj1(X), x1) ⇐ kε(X, 〈x1, x2〉)
Figure 5 shows those obtained for f = ⊕ and an arbitrary w.
C. Soundness and completeness
We show that as far as reachability and intruder knowledge
predicates are concerned, the set seed(P ) is a complete
abstraction of a process. However, we need one more definition
to state this fact.
Definition 8: Given a set K of statements, H(K) is the
smallest set of ground facts such that:
CONSEQ
f =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ K
σ grounding for f with skel(fσ) in normal form
B1σ ∈ H(K), . . . , Bnσ ∈ H(K)
Hσ ∈ H(K)
EXTEND
ku(R, t) ∈ H(K)
kuv(R, t) ∈ H(K)
Theorem 1: Let P be a ground process.
• P |= f for any f ∈ seed(P ) ∪H(seed(P ));
• If (P, ∅) L1,...,Lm−−−−−−→ (Q,ϕ) for some (Q,ϕ), then
1) rL1ϕ↓,...,Lmϕ↓ ∈ H(seed(P )); and
2) if ϕ `R t then kL1ϕ↓,...,Lmϕ↓(R, t↓) ∈ H(seed(P )).
We will see that the completeness of seed(P ) can be built
upon to achieve full abstraction, i.e., also including identities
of the process P and a procedure for checking equivalence.
IV. SATURATION
We shall now describe how to verify equivalence given
the protocol representation as Horn clauses introduced in the
previous section. Given a ground process P and a protocol Q,
we saturate the set of seed statements for P to construct a set
of simple statements which we will call solved statements. The
saturation procedure ensures that the set of solved statements
is a complete abstraction of P . Then, we use the resulting
solved statements to decide whether P is trace included in Q.
Repeating this procedure for all P ∈ P , and doing similarly
for processes in Q, we are then able to decide whether two
determinate protocols P and Q are in trace equivalence.
In this section we will describe the saturation procedure. It
manipulates a set of statements called a knowledge base.
Definition 9: Given a statement f = (H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn),
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• f is said to be solved if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have that
Bi = k`1,...,`ji (Xi, xi) for some xi ∈ X , and Xi ∈ Y .
• f is said to be well-formed if whenever it is solved and
H = k`1,...,`k(R, t), we have that t 6∈ X .
A set of well-formed statements is called a knowledge base.
If K is a knowledge base, Ksolved = {f ∈ K | f is solved }.
Given an initial knowledge base K, the saturation proce-
dure is a non-deterministic process which produces another
knowledge base. At each step of the saturation procedure, a
new statement is generated and the knowledge base is updated
with the new statement. This two-step process is repeated until
a fixed point is reached. We denote by sat(K) the set of
reachable fixed points starting from the initial set K.
Before describing these two steps in Section IV-B, we
explain in the following section why a naive adaptation of
the original AKISS procedure would not be effective.
A. Difficulties
In the original procedure [18], the saturated knowledge
base is obtained by applying (among others) the following
resolution rule based on most general unifiers (mgu):
f = (H ⇐ kuv(X, t), B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ K
g = (kw(R, t
′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm) ∈ Ksolved
σ = mgu(ku(X, t), kw(R, t
′)) t 6∈ X
K = K d h
where h =
(
(H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn, Bn+1, . . . , Bm)σ
)
.
This rule is close to a standard resolution step, between
an unsolved statement f and a solved deduction statement g.
Note, however, that we do not impose the two symbolic runs
involved in this resolution step to be unifiable but we only
require that w is unifiable with a prefix of the other symbolic
run (namely u). Intuitively, this comes from the fact that the
knowledge of the attacker is monotone (the attacker never
forgets any data), and a term t′σ deducible in the run wσ
will remain deducible in any extension of this run.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider here that the update
operator d simply adds h to K. A naive approach to add
the xor operator consists in replacing the condition σ =
mgu(ku(X, t), kw(R, t
′)) by σ ∈ csuAC(ku(X, t), kw(R, t′)),
i.e, performing unification modulo AC instead of simply
computing the mgu between these two terms. The obtained
procedure would be correct but would rarely terminate.
Example 11: Let P = in(c, z1).in(c, z2).[z2 = a⊕z1].0 and
w = in(c, z1), in(c, a⊕ z1). The set seed(P ) contains (among
others) the following statements:
rw,test ⇐ kε(Z1, z1), kw(Z2, a⊕ z1)
kw(X ⊕ Y, x⊕ y) ⇐ kw(X,x), kw(Y, y)
The resolution rule can be applied on these two statements,
and one of the substitutions is
σ = {x 7→ a⊕ z11, y 7→ z12, z1 7→ z11 ⊕ z12}
resulting in the following statement:
rwσ ⇐ kε(Z1, z11 ⊕ z12), kwσ(X, a⊕ z11), kwσ(Y, z12).
This statement can again be resolved using the same statement
as before, yielding an infinite loop.
B. Saturation procedure
We now explain our saturation procedure which is inspired
from the one given in [18]. First, as expected, we perform
resolution modulo associativity and commutativity (AC) to
capture algebraic properties of xor. Second, in order to achieve
termination in practice, we constrained the resolution rules in
various ways while preserving completeness of our procedure.
1) Generating new statements: Given a knowledge base K,
new statements f are generated by applying the rules in
Figure 6. Each of these rules generates a new statement h.
Roughly, as already explained, the rule RESOLUTION applies
the standard rule of resolution from first-order logic between
an unsolved statement f and a solved deduction statement g
and allows us to propagate constraints imposed from a partial
execution of a trace to its possible extensions through the
unification of the symbolic runs u and w.
The rule RESOLUTION+ does essentially the same for the
statement g = f+0 but applies some special treatments to
avoid non-termination issues. The rule EQUATION allows us
to derive new identities on recipes that may be imposed by
the execution of the protocol. The rule TEST allows us to
conclude which identities necessarily hold in an execution of
the protocol. Once the statement h is generated, we update the
knowledge base K with h. This process is explained below.
More precisely, we restrict the use of the resolution rule
and we only apply it on a selected atom. To formalise this, we
assume a selection function sel which returns ⊥ when applied
on a solved statement, and an atom kw(X, t) with t 6∈ X
when applied on an unsolved statement. Resolution must be
performed on this selected atom.
In order to avoid the termination problem illustrated in the
previous section when considering equational theories that
include xor, we introduce a marking on atomic formulas in
the hypothesis of unsolved statements. The marking is used
to disallow resolution against a statement in f+0 . We denote
unsolved statements with their marking as
H ⇐ B1, . . . Bn ‖M
where M ⊆ {B1, . . . , Bn} is the set of hypotheses of the
statement which are marked. Marking will only be used for
unsolved statements, and we implicitly set an empty marking
on newly generated solved statements. Statements in f+1
and f+2 will be marked directly when constructing the initial
knowledge base. More precisely, we mark the two hypotheses
of any statement in f+1 ∪ f
+
2 (see Definition 14). Intuitively,
completeness is preserved as derivation trees in H(K) can
always be reorganised by pushing the use of CONSEQ rules
with statement in f+0 below those with statements in f
+
1
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and f+2 . Other statements will be marked dynamically in rule
RESOLUTION+, i.e., when performing resolution against a
statement in f+0 : to decide which of the two new hypotheses
has to be marked we rely on the following notions.
Definition 10: Given a term t, we define factor(t) =
{t1, . . . , tn} when
⊕
i ti = t and none of the ti is itself a
sum. The function rigid(t) returns a term ti ∈ factor(t) such
that ti 6∈ X or ⊥ if no such ti exists.
When performing RESOLUTION+ with a selected atom for
which a rigid factor can be found, we mark the hypothesis of
the generated statements that contains the factor returned by
rigid. This factor has to be rigid in the sense that it cannot be
a variable. Again, we can show that we preserve completeness
when marking this hypothesis. When we need to derive a term
which is a sum, and we decide to split this sum in two parts, we
will assume that the chosen rigid factor has to be obtained in an
atomic way (it cannot be the result of a sum anymore). This
amounts to favour one arrangement among all the possible
ones up to associativity and commutativity of the xor operator.
Example 12: Going back to Example 11, we have that
RESOLUTION+ will be applied between these two statements,
and rigid(a⊕z1) necessarily returns a. Therefore, the resulting
statement becomes:
rwσ ⇐ kε(Z1, z11 ⊕ z12), kwσ(X, a⊕ z11), kwσ(Y, z12) ‖M
where M = {kwσ(X, a⊕ z11)}.
This forbids the use of RESOLUTION+ on kwσ(X, a⊕z11).
Provided that our function sel returns kwσ(X, a ⊕ z11), the
saturation procedure can now only do a RESOLUTION rule
on the next statement and therefore the non termination issue
mentioned in Example 11 is avoided.
Example 13: The marking of f+1 and f
+
2 is also important
to ensure termination in practice. Indeed, otherwise, it would
be possible to apply the RESOLUTION+ rule between f+1 (and
f+0 ) on the atom kw(X1, x1⊕x2). However, the term x1⊕x2
has no rigid factor, and among the resulting statements, we
will find the following one:
kwσ(X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X3, x11 ⊕ x12)⇐ kwσ(X1, x11 ⊕ x21),
kwσ(X2, x12 ⊕ x22),
kwσ(X3, x21 ⊕ x22) ‖ ∅
As no literal is marked, whatever is the selection function,
the RESOLUTION+ rule could be applied and the saturation
procedure would enter an infinite loop.
Finally, the RESOLUTION and RESOLUTION+ rules induce
a parent/child relationship between the unsolved statement
used in the rule and the generated statement, which will
eventually be added to the knowledge base after canonization
(see below). This relation allows us to define the ancestor
of any statement to be the parent of its parent etc. until we
reach an unsolved statement in the initial knowledge base. In
the following, we need to distinguish all deduction statements
whose oldest ancestor belongs to f+1 ∪f
+
2 (with marking). We
call these statements VIP statement, and they will deserve a
privileged treatment in the update.
2) Update: We will now define the update operator d
which adds statements generated by the rules of Figure 6
to the knowledge base. We first need to introduce the set of
consequences of a knowledge base.
Definition 11: Let K be a knowledge base, the set of
consequences, conseq(K), is the smallest set such that
AXIOM
kuv(R, t)⇐ ku(R, t), B1, . . . , Bm ∈ conseq(K)
RES
ku(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ∈ K σ a substitution
Biσ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm ∈ conseq(K) 1 ≤ i ≤ n
kuv(R, t)σ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm ∈ conseq(K)
We shall see that a weak form of update is sufficient
when considering a deduction statement that is already a
consequence of the knowledge base up to a change of recipe.
Definition 12: The canonical form f⇓ of a statement
f =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ‖M
)
is the statement obtained by first normalizing all the recipes,
then applying the rule REMOVE as many times as possible,
and for solved deduction statement, applying the rule SHIFT
as many times as possible.
REMOVE
H ⇐ kuv(X, t), ku(Y, t), B1, . . . , Bn ‖M
with X 6∈ vars(H)
H ⇐ ku(Y, t), B1, . . . , Bn ‖M \ kuv(X, t)
SHIFT
kuv(R, t)⇐ ku(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn with x ∈ factor(t)
kuv(R⊕X, t⊕ x↓)⇐ ku(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn
Definition 13: Let K be a knowledge base, and f a
statement. The update of K by f , denoted K d f , is K
when skel(f) is not in normal form (the statement is dropped).
Otherwise, two options are possible:
• K d f = K ∪ {f⇓};
• K d f = K ∪{iw(R↓, R′↓)⇐ B1, . . . Bn} provided that
– f⇓ =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . Bn
)
, and
– f is a solved statement but not a VIP one, and
–
(
kw(R
′, t)⇐ B1, . . . Bn
)
∈ conseq(Ksolved).
Note that the update is not a function because there may
be several R′ for which the second option can be chosen.
Even when such an R′ exists, we may still update the base by
choosing the first option. These choices are implementation
details, and our results hold regardless.
3) Initial knowledge base: We finally define on which
knowledge base we initiate the saturation procedure.
Definition 14: Let P be a ground process, and N 0pub be a
set of names. We have that
seed(P,N 0pub) = f+0 ] f
+
1 ] f
+
2 ] f
+
3 ] f
+
4 ] S
9
RESOLUTION
f =
(
H ⇐ kuv(X, t), B1, . . . , Bn ‖M
)
∈ K such that kuv(X, t) = sel(f)
g =
(
kw(R, t
′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
∈ Ksolved r f+0
K = K d {hσ | σ ∈ csuAC(ku(X, t), kw(R, t′))}
where h =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn, Bn+1, . . . , Bm ‖Mr {kuv(X, t)}
)
RESOLUTION+
f =
(
H ⇐ ku(X, t), B1, . . . , Bn ‖M
)
∈ K such that ku(X, t) = sel(f) and ku(X, t) 6∈ M
K = K d {hσ | σ ∈ csuAC(〈X, t〉, 〈X1 ⊕X2, x1 ⊕ x2〉)}
where h =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn, ku(X1, x1), ku(X2, x2) ‖ M′
)
and M′ =M∪ {ku(Xi, xi) | rigid(t)σ ∈ factor(xiσ) and i ∈ {1, 2}}
EQUATION
f, g ∈ (Ksolved r f+0 ) f =
(
ku(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
g =
(
ku′v′(R
′, t′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
K = K d {hσ | σ ∈ csuAC(〈u, t〉, 〈u′, t′〉)} where h = (iu′v′(R,R′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)
TEST
f, g ∈ Ksolved, f =
(
iu(R,R
′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
g =
(
ru′v′ ⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
K = K d {hσ | σ ∈ csuAC(u, u′)} where h = (riu′v′(R,R′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)
Fig. 6: Saturation rules
where fi (with 0 ≤ i ≤ 4) are defined as given in Figure 5,
and S are the remaining statements. Let K0 be the set of
statements which contains:
1) deduction statements in f+0 ∩ seed(P,N 0pub);
2) deduction statements in (f+1 ∪ f
+
2 )∩ seed(P,N 0pub) with
their two hypotheses marked:
kw(X1 ⊕X2, t)⇐ B1, B2 ‖ {B1, B2}.
The initial knowledge base associated to seed(P,N 0pub),
denoted Kinit(seed(P,N 0pub)), is defined to be K0 updated by
the set S, i.e.,
Kinit(seed(P,N 0pub)) = (((K0 d g1) d g2) . . . gk)
where g1, . . . , gk is an enumeration of the statements in S. We
sometimes write Kinit(P ) for Kinit(seed(P,N 0pub)).
When building the initial knowledge base we first add some
of the variants related to ⊕. Note in particular that we mark all
hypotheses of the variants in f+1 and f
+
2 (Figure 5), and we
do not add statements in f+3 and f
+
4 . All other seed statements
are simply added using the update operator.
Please observe that Kinit(P ) depends on the order in which
statements in seed(P ) are updated. The exact order, however,
is not important and our results shall hold regardless of the
chosen order. The saturation procedure takes Kinit(P ) as an
input and produces a knowledge base Ksat ∈ sat(Kinit(P )).
The reason for choosing Kinit(P ) instead of seed(P ) as the
starting point of the saturation procedure is that seed(P ) may
not be a knowledge base (recall that a knowledge base is a set
of well-formed statements). The fact that the set Kinit(P ) is,
however, a knowledge base follows directly from the fact that
we apply our SHIFT rule (through the canonization process)
before adding a deduction statement to the current set.
REFL
iw(R,R) ∈ He(K)
EXT
iu(R,R
′) ∈ He(K)
iuv(R,R
′) ∈ He(K)
CONG
iw(R1, R
′
1), . . . , iw(Rn, R
′
n) ∈ He(K) f ∈ Σ
iw(f(R1, . . . Rn), f(R
′
1, . . . R
′
n)) ∈ He(K)
MOD-I
iw(R1, R2) ∈ He(K) Ri↓ =AC R′i↓ i ∈ {1, 2}
iw(R
′
1, R
′
2) ∈ He(K)
MOD-RI
riw(R1, R2) ∈ He(K) Ri↓ =AC R′i↓ i ∈ {1, 2}
riw(R
′
1, R
′
2) ∈ He(K)
EQ. CONSEQ.
kw(R, t) ∈ H(K) iw(R,R′) ∈ He(K)
kw(R
′, t) ∈ He(K)
Fig. 7: Rules of He(K)
C. Soundness and completeness
We shall show that the solved statements of any
K ∈ sat(Kinit(P )) form a complete abstraction of P , with
respect to some extension of H that we define next.
Definition 15: Let K be a set of statements. We define
He(K) to be the smallest set of ground facts containing H(K)
and that is closed under the rules of Figure 7.
Theorem 2: Let K ∈ sat(Kinit(P )) for some ground
process P . We have that P |= f for any f ∈ K ∪ He(K)
and, if (P, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (Q,ϕ), then:
1) rL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓ ∈ He(Ksolved);
2) if ϕ `R t then kL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R, t↓) ∈ He(Ksolved);
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3) if ϕ `R t and ϕ `R′ t, then iL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R,R′) ∈
He(Ksolved).
The proof follows the same general outline as in the original
argument without xor [18]. However, some points that were
irrelevant or straightforward in the original proof require
special attention here.
As explained before, our marking discipline is justified by
means of rearrangements of CONSEQ rules with f+0 statements
in derivation trees of H(K). Due to these rearrangements,
inductions on derivation trees are not straightforward anymore.
We sometimes have to prove the existence of a derivation tree
which is smaller only for a complex measure, where in the
original proof a standard induction on the size of the derivation
tree or on the size of the recipe of the head was sufficient.
The existence of these other derivation trees themselves relies
on invariants of the saturation procedure that we enforce by
the canonization rules and the distinguished VIP statements.
This is in sharp contrast with the original proof where the
canonization rules only act as an optimization to terminate
faster.
We finally note that our saturation procedure also brings
new improvements that are not directly related to xor (e.g.,
removal of non normal terms, canonization for unsolved
statements) but which we had to introduce (and justify) to
obtain an effective procedure supporting xor. Discarding these
unnecessary statements could also improve the efficiency of
the original AKISS procedure.
V. ALGORITHM
In this section, we first discuss the effectiveness and termi-
nation of the saturation procedure, and describe our algorithm
to verify trace inclusion for determinate processes.
A. Effectiveness of the procedure
The termination of the procedure has been proved for the
original version of AKISS but only for subterm convergent
equational theories. It is shown, among others, that the initial
knowledge base only needs to be derived from finitely many
seed statements, and in particular it does not need to contains
all fresh nonces the attacker can generate. As stated below,
this result is also true in our setting.
Lemma 1: Let P be a ground process, NPpub ⊆ Npub be the
finite set of public names occurring in P . We have that:
sat(Kinit(P )) ⊇
{K ∪ ext(K) | K ∈ sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub)))}.
where ext(K) is the set containing the following statements:
• kε(n, n)⇐ for any n ∈ Npub rNPpub;
• iε(n, n)⇐ for any n ∈ Npub rNPpub;
• riu(n, n) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn for any ru ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ∈ K
in solved form, any n ∈ Npub rNPpub.
Another issue is that, when computing the update operator,
we need to check whether there exists R such that the
statement kw(R, t) ⇐ B1, . . . Bn is a consequence of a set
of solved statements. This can be achieved using a simple
backward search, similar to the one in [18].
However, with the addition of the xor, the saturation pro-
cedure may itself not terminate even if the initial knowledge
base is finite and each saturation step is computable. A first
reason would be the use of an unsuitable selection function. In
order to avoid termination issues, we will consider a selection
function that selects in priority a marked literal when it exists,
a literal which is not a sum otherwise, and one that contains a
rigid factor as a last resort. In case there is no other choice than
selecting a literal containing a sum of variables the saturation
enters an infinite loop as illustrated by the following example.
Example 14: Consider the ground process:
P = in(c, x).in(c, y).in(c, z).[x = y ⊕ z].0.
Among others, the set of seed statements will contain:
rw ⇐ kw1(X, y ⊕ z), kw2(Y, y), kw3(Z, z) ‖ ∅
where w = in(c, y ⊕ z).in(c, y).in(c, z).test, and for some
w1, w2, and w3 that we do not specify since they are not
relevant here. The RESOLUTION+ rule will be applied on the
first hypothesis, and since there is no rigid factor in y⊕ z, no
hypothesis will be marked. We will therefore generate (among
others) a new statement of the following form:
r⇐ k(X1, y1 ⊕ z1), k(X2, y2 ⊕ z2),
k(Y, y1 ⊕ y2), k(Z, z1 ⊕ z2) ‖ ∅
on which the same RESOLUTION+ rule can be applied again,
entering an infinite loop.
Even though this example illustrates that termination is not
guaranteed, we were able to verify a large range of different
protocols, as illustrated in Section VI.
B. Description and correctness of the algorithm
Our procedure is described in Figure 8. Let P be a protocol,
i.e., a finite set of processes, and P be a ground process.
Let K0 ∈ sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub))) be a saturation of P
where NPpub is the set containing all public names occurring
in P . In our procedure the process P will be represented by
the set K0solved of solved statements of K
0.
The test REACH-IDENTITY(K0solved,P) checks whether each
reachable identity ri`1,...,`n(R,R
′) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm in K0solved
holds in P . To perform this check for a given reachable
identity, we first compute the recipes Ri that allow the
process P to execute the trace `1σ, . . . , `nσ. The substitution
σ replaces variables by fresh names in order to close the run.
Next we check whether the corresponding trace (M1, . . . ,Mn)
is executable in P and whether the test Rω ?= R′ω holds
in the resulting frame ϕ, i.e., the frame reached by P after
performing M1, . . . ,Mn. If all the tests succeed, P is trace
included in P . If one test fails, the algorithm returns this test
as a witness of non equivalence.
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REACH-IDENTITY(K0solved,P)
For all ri`1,...,`n(R,R
′)⇐ kw1(X1, x1), . . . , kwm(Xm, xm) ∈ K0solved
let c1, . . . , ck be fresh public names such that σ : vars(`1, . . . , `n) ∪ {x1, . . . , xm} → {c1, . . . , ck} is a bijection
for all i such that `i = in(di, ti), let Ri be such that k`1σ,...,`i−1σ(Ri, tiσ) ∈ H(K0solved ∪ {kε(ci, ci)⇐ | 1 ≤ i ≤ k})
let Mi =
{
`i if `i ∈ {test, out(c) | c ∈ Ch}
in(di, Ri) if `i = in(di, ti)
check that (P, ∅) M1,...,Mn======⇒ (P,ϕ) and Rωϕ↓ =AC R′ωϕ↓ where ω = {Xi 7→ xiσ}.
Fig. 8: Test for checking P v P
Theorem 3: Let P be a ground process, and NPpub ⊆ Npub
be the finite set of public names occurring in P . Let P be a
protocol, and K0 ∈ sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub))). We have that:
• if P v P then REACH-IDENTITY(K0solved,P) holds;
• if P is determinate and REACH-IDENTITY(K0solved,P)
holds then P v P .
Note that REACH-IDENTITY requires to compute, for each
input of the run, a recipe Ri. It necessarily exists (as the run
`1, . . . , `n is reachable) and its computation amounts to finding
R such that kw(R, t) ∈ H(K) given w, t,K. This can be
achieved using a simple recursive backward search, as in [18].
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND CASE STUDIES
Given that our procedure may not terminate, our main goal
was to evaluate whether termination is achieved in practice.
We validate our approach by integrating our procedure in the
tool AKISS [3] and by testing it on various examples.
A. Integration in AKISS
Our implementation includes the marking strategy, a se-
lection function that returns in priority an hypothesis that is
marked and reasoning modulo AC. In general, it is difficult to
implement unification and computation of variants for theories
involving an AC operator. We leverage an existing tool, namely
Maude [35], which implements such algorithms efficiently. To
minimize the high cost of external calls to Maude, we also
implement a naive algorithm for AC unification that handles
most of the simple cases internally, and we only call Maude
for solving the difficult cases (∼ 3% of cases in practice).
To ease the specification of the protocols our tool supports
additional operators in the process calculus for parallel compo-
sition (P ‖ Q), non-deterministic choice (P ++Q), sequential
composition (P ::Q), and a phase operator (P >>Q). The
latter allows at any moment during the execution of P to
proceed to the execution of Q and will be used among others
to model resistance against guessing attacks as done e.g.
in the ProVerif tool [16]. All these operators are syntactic
sugar and can be translated to sets of (linear) processes in
a straightforward way.
To mitigate the potential exponential blowup caused by this
translation, partial order reduction techniques [8], [9] can be
used. We integrate some of these optimisations which notably
consist in automatically prioritising outputs when protocols are
determinate [9].
Note that for AKISS finding attacks or proving their absence
are equally difficult tasks, as for both it first completes
the saturation of the traces. However, for some equivalence
properties, one of the inclusions is trivially satisfied. In such a
case, we only check the inclusion that is not trivially satisfied
and therefore reduce by two the number of symbolic traces
to explore. Note that our procedure easily allows to check
inclusion instead of equivalence.
We now report on experimental results that have been
obtained by running our tool on a 20 core Intel(R) Xeon(R)
@ 3.10GHz with 300 GB of RAM.
B. Unlinkability of RFID protocols
We analyse an unlinkability property on various RFID
protocols that rely on the xor operator. A description of these
protocols can be found in [41], [36], [7], and one of them,
namely the KCL protocol, is detailed in Example 4.
We model unlinkability as an interaction between the reader
and either tag1 or tag2 assuming that the attacker has previ-
ously observed a session between the reader and tag1. We use
the process Ptag (Example 4) to model the tag. The processes
Ptag1 and Ptag2 are slightly different versions of Ptag. More
precisely, they are obtained from Ptag by replacing id and k
by id1 and k1 (resp. id2 and k2). Then, we consider a process
Pinit to model the outputs observed by an attacker during an
honest interaction between tag1 and the reader:
Pinit = out(c, r). out(c, 〈id1 ⊕ r′, h(〈r, k1〉)⊕ r′〉). 0
Using non-deterministic choice we model that the reader
may engage a session with tag1 (using id1 and key k1) or
tag2 (using id2 and key k2):
Preader = out(c, r1). in(c, y).
([(proj1(y)⊕ id)⊕ proj2(y) = h(〈r1, k1〉)]. 0)
++ ([(proj1(y)⊕ id)⊕ proj2(y) = h(〈r1, k2〉)]. 0)
Unlinkability can finally be expressed as the following
process equivalence:
Pinit :: (Ptag1 ‖ Preader) ≈ Pinit :: (Ptag2 ‖ Preader)
The (known) attack explained in Example 8 on a simplified
scenario (without the readers) is again found by the tool. A
possible fix would be to replace the message h(〈r1, k〉)⊕r2 by
h(〈r1, k⊕r2〉). Our tool is then able to establish unlinkability.
In total we modelled 7 RFID protocols: KCL, LD, LAK,
OTYT and YPL from [41]; MW from [36]; and AT from [7].
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Note that one inclusion trivially holds: when considering two
different tags less equalities hold than in the case of two iden-
tical tags. We can therefore avoid unnecessary computations
and only check the other inclusion, i.e.:
Pinit :: (Ptag1 ‖ Preader) v Pinit :: (Ptag2 ‖ Preader)
On 4 of the 7 protocols we find (known) attacks which
violate unlinkability. The results are summarised in Figure 9
and confirm termination of the saturation procedure with our
resolution strategy when analysing unlinkability on various
RFID protocols. When there is no attack, we consider an
additional scenario where the attacker can abort its first
observation to start a new session:
Pinit ::
(
(Ptag1 ‖ Preader)>> (Ptag1 ‖ Preader)
)
≈ Pinit ::
(
(Ptag2 ‖ Preader)>> (Ptag2 ‖ Preader)
)
RFID Protocol # sessions # traces time result
KCL (Ex. 4) 1 1 1s 5
KCL 1 20 3s 5
KCL fixed 1 20 <1s 3
KCL fixed 2 980 1m47 3
LD 1 20 <1s 5
OTYT 1 20 <1s 5
YPL 1 20 <1s 5
LAK 1 20 <1s 3
LAK 2 980 30m 3
MW 1 40 7s 3
MW 2 4280 10h 3
AT 1 20 1s 3
AT 2 1040 33s 3
We note 3 when AKISS concludes that the property holds and 5
when it reports an attack.
Fig. 9: Summary for RFID protocols
C. Resistance against offline guessing attacks
We analyse resistance against offline guessing attacks on
various password based protocols that rely on the exclusive-or
operator from [31]. Protocols which rely on passwords are
often subject to off-line guessing attacks: an attacker may
observe, or even actively participate in an execution of the
protocol and then, in a second, offline phase, verify if a
guessed value is indeed the real password without further
interaction with the protocol. During this offline verification
phase, the attacker has to try all possible values for the
password and perform a test to check whether a guess is
the real password or not. This can be modelled relying on
trace equivalence by checking whether the attacker can make
a difference between a scenario where the real password is
revealed at the end, and another one where a wrong password
is revealed [24], [12].
We illustrate this encoding on the so-called direct authenti-
cation protocol [31] whose description is detailed below.
Direct authentication protocol. A and B initially share a
poorly chosen secret pw, and wish to establish a session key k.
To achieve this goal, A generates a public key pub and sends it
to B encrypted with pw together with a challenge ra. B replies
by computing a ciphertext that contains fresh nonces nb1,
nb2, and another one cb called a confounder. This ciphertext
also contains an encryption of the challenge ra with pw for
authentication purposes. Then, A generates a fresh key k, and
a challenge response mechanism is used to ensure that both
parties agree on the key.
A→ B : ra, {pub}pw
B → A : {B,A, nb1, nb2, cb, {ra}pw}pub
A→ B : {nb1, k ⊕ nb2}pw
B → A : {f1(ra), rb}k
A→ B : {f2(rb)}k
This protocol has been designed to be resistant against guess-
ing attacks. An attacker should not be able to perform an
off-line verification of whether a guess of the password is
successful or not. Actually, several examples of such protocols
are described in [31]. They try to achieve the same goal relying
on slightly different primitives or considering a different
environment (e.g. some of them rely on a trusted third party S).
We model resistance against guessing attacks by checking
an equivalence property between a scenario where the real
password is revealed at the end, and another where a wrong
password (modeled through a fresh name) is revealed [24],
[12]. For each protocol, we consider one session between
two honest agents A and B (and the trusted third party S
when needed). Resistance against guessing attacks is expressed
through the following equivalence:
(PA ‖ PB)>> out(c, pw) ≈ (PA ‖ PB)>> out(c, pw′)
where pw is the real password, and pw′ is the fresh name.
In total, we modelled 5 password-based protocols: the Toy,
Nonce, Secret Public Key, and Direct Authentication protocols
from [31], as well as a protocol by Gong [30]. For each
protocol we first verify resistance against guessing attacks in
the presence of a passive adversary, i.e. a pure eavesdropper.
Whenever this equivalence holds, we analyse the active case
for one session. Since one inclusion trivially holds, we only
check the other one, i.e.:
(PA ‖ PB)>> out(c, pw) v (PA ‖ PB)>> out(c, pw′)
The results are summarised in Figure 10 and illustrate that
our tool can also be effectively used to analyse resistance
against guessing attacks on various password-based protocols.
The Direct Auth protocol has been tested with two instances
of each role in parallel, the other protocols (Nonce and Sec
Pub Key) require more than 50Gb of memory and have not
been successfully tested.
D. Other case studies
We have also encoded some authentication properties as
equivalences for both RFID protocols that guarantee unlinka-
bility (the LAK and fixed KCL protocols) and for a xor-based
variant of the NSL protocol [21]. For both LAK and NSL-xor
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passive case active case
time result #sessions # tr. time result
Toy <1s 3 1 5 <1s 5
Nonce <1s 3 1 90 4s 3
Sec PubKey <1s 3 1 90 4s 3
Direct Auth <1s 3
1 29 <1s 3
2 18k 9m 3
Gong 26s 5 not relevant
We note 3 when AKISS concludes that the property holds and 5
when it reports an attack.
Fig. 10: Summary for password-based protocols
we are able to find (known) attacks. The attack on NSL-xor is
a variant of Lowe’s classical man in the middle attack which
is prevented on NSL, but possible on NSL-xor. To find the
attack we analyse a scenario where A starts a session with the
attacker and B a session with A.
Finally, on the NSL-xor protocol we verified strong secrecy
of the nonces na and nb, as defined by Blanchet [14]: the
adversary initially provides two values and must be unable
to distinguish the situations where the first, respectively, the
second value is used as the secret. For instance strong secrecy
of the nonce na is modelled as follows.
in(c, x1).in(c, x2) :: NSL{x1/na}
≈
in(c, x1).in(c, x2) :: NSL{x2/na}
We show that neither na nor nb are strongly secret, even
when we only consider one honest session among A and B.
The results are summarised in Figure 11.
Protocol # sessions # traces time result
LAK auth 1 1 <1s 5
KCL fixed auth 1 1 <1s 3
KCL fixed auth 2 36 3s 3
NSL xor
-auth 1 3 <1s 5
-strong secrecy na 1 6 9s 5
-strong secrecy nb 1 6 <1s 5
We note 3 when AKISS concludes that the property holds and 5
when it reports an attack.
Fig. 11: Summary for other protocols
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented what we believe is the first effective procedure
to verify equivalence properties for protocols that use xor.
The need for such verification techniques is among others
motivated by the unlinkability property in RFID protocols.
Our procedure builds on the theory underlying the AKISS tool
and presents a novel resolution strategy which we show to be
complete. Even though termination is not guaranteed the tool
did terminate on all practical examples that we have tested.
Directions for future work include adding new canonization
rules to extend the termination proof of AKISS [18] to theories
including the xor operator. Another direction is to consider
other AC operators such as Diffie-Hellman exponentiation
and bilinear pairings, which are supported by the Tamarin
tool [38].
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APPENDIX
PROOFS REGARDING SEED STATEMENTS
As the construction of the seed is similar to the one in [18],
the proof closely follows the original proof, generalising it to
reason modulo AC.
A. Soundness
The soundness part of Theorem 1 is a consequence of
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Lemma 2: Let P be a ground process. We have that P |= f
for any statement f ∈ seed(P ).
Proof. We suppose the same naming conventions for P as
in Definition of seed statements (see Section III-B). We prove
that for each statement f ∈ seed(P ) we have that P |= f .
There are four kinds of seed statements (see Figure 4) which
we consider one-by-one.
Case 1. Let m be such that 0 ≤ m ≤ n, σ and τ be sub-
stitutions such that σ ∈ csuR,AC({sk = tk}k∈T (m)) and
τ ∈ variantsR,AC(`1σ, . . . , `mσ). Let f be the following
statement:
r`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓ ⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈R(m)
We have to show that P |= f . Let ω be an arbitrary
substitution grounding for f . We assume furthermore that
P |= (k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓))ω for any j ∈ R(m). We
have to show that P |= (r`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓)ω. In fact we will
show a stronger statement. We show that
P |= (r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω for all 0 ≤ p ≤ m.
We proceed by induction on p. When p = 0, we have that
(r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω = r, and P |= (r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω trivially.
Now, assume that p > 0, and P |= (r`1στ↓,...,`p−1στ↓)ω. We
have to show that P |= (r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω by case analysis
on ap. Before, we do the case analysis, let us first fix some
notations.
Let (P1, ϕ1) = (P, ∅). As P |= (r`1στ↓,...,`p−1στ↓)ω, we
have that there exist L1, . . . , Lp−1 such that for all 1 ≤ i < p
(Pi, ϕi)
Li−→ (Pi+1, ϕi+1) and Liϕi↓ =AC `iστ↓ω↓
where
• Pi = (ai. . . . .an){xj 7→ xjστ↓ω↓}j∈R(i−1); and
• ϕi extends ϕi−1.
We can now do the case analysis.
1) Case ap = out(cp, tp). We have that `p = out(cp).
Let Lp = out(cp), Pp+1 = (ap+1. . . . .an){xj 7→
xjστ↓ω↓}j∈R(p) and ϕp+1 = ϕp ∪ {w|dom(ϕp)|+1 7→
tpστ↓ω↓}. We have:
(Pp, ϕp)
Lp−−→ (Pp+1, ϕp+1)
which is what we wanted to prove.
2) Case ap = [sp = tp]. We have that `p = test. Let
Pp+1 = (ap+1. . . . .an){xj 7→ xjστ↓ω↓}j∈R(p) and let
ϕp+1 = ϕp. As σ ∈ csuR,AC({sk = tk}k∈T (m)), we have
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spσ↓ =AC tpσ↓ and therefore spστ↓ω↓ =AC tpστ↓ω↓.
Hence, we have that
(Tp, ϕp)
test−−→ (Tp+1, ϕp+1)
which is what we wanted to prove.
3) Case ap = in(cp, xp). We have p ∈ R(p) and `p =
in(cp, xp).
Let Pp+1 = (ap+1. . . . .an){xj 7→ xjστ↓ω↓}j∈R(p), and
ϕp+1 = ϕp. As p ∈ R(p), we have that
P |= (k`1στ↓,...,`p−1στ↓(Xp, xpστ↓))ω
(this is an antecendent of f ). Therefore ϕp `Xpω xpστ↓ω
and, by letting Lp = in(cp, Xpω), we obtain by the
definition of −→ that
(Pp, ϕp)
Lp−−→ (Pp+1, ϕp+1)
which is what we wanted to prove.
We have shown that P |= (r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω.
Case 2. Let m ∈ S(n), σ ∈ csuR,AC({sk = tk}k∈T (m)), and
τ ∈ variantsR,AC(`1σ, . . . , `mσ, tmσ). Let f be the following
statement:
k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|S(m)|, tmστ↓)
⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈R(m)
We have to show that P |= f . Let ω be an arbitrary
substitution grounding for f . We assume furthermore that
P |= (k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓))ω for any j ∈ R(m). We
have to show that P |= (k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|S(m)|, tmστ↓))ω.
Let Pi = (ai. . . . .an){xj 7→ xjστ↓ω↓}j∈R(i−1) and let
ϕi = ∪1≤j≤|S(i−1)|{wj 7→ to(j)στω↓}
where o(j) = min{x | |S(x)| = j}, i.e. o(j) denotes the index
of the jth send action.
We distinguish two cases:
1) if there exist L1, . . . , Lm such that
(P1, ϕ1)
L1−−→ (P2, ϕ2)
L2−−→ . . . Lm−−→ (Pm+1, ϕm+1)
and Liϕi↓ =AC `iστ↓ω↓ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have that
ϕm+1(w|S(m)|) = to(|S(m)|)στω↓ = tmστω↓
and we have that ϕm+1 `w|S(m)| tmστω↓ and therefore
ϕm+1 `w|S(m)| tmστ↓ω which implies that
P |= (k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|S(m)|, tmστ↓))ω.
2) otherwise, we trivially have that:
P |= k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|S(m)|, (tmστ)↓)ω.
We have shown that T |= f .
Case 3. Let c be a public name. We have that ∅ `c c, and
therefore P |=
(
kε(c, c)⇐
)
trivially holds.
Case 4. Let m be such that 0 ≤ m ≤ n. Let f be a function
symbol of arity k and let τ ∈ variantsR,AC(f(y1, . . . , yk)).
Let f be the following statement:
k`1,...,`m(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓)⇐
k`1,...,`m(Y1, y1τ↓), . . . , k`1,...,`m(Yk, ykτ↓)
Let ω be an arbitrary substitution grounding for f . We
assume that P |= k`1,...,`m(Yj , yjτ↓)ω for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
We distinguish two cases:
1) if there exist L1, . . . , Lm such that
(P1, ϕ1)
L1−−→ (P2, ϕ2)
L2−−→ . . . Lm−−→ (Pm+1, ϕm+1)
and Liϕi↓ =AC `iστ↓ω↓ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have that
ϕm+1 `Yjω yjτ↓ω for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. This implies that
ϕm+1 `f(Y1ω,...,Ykω) f(y1τ↓ω, . . . , ykτ↓ω), and therefore
P |= (k`1,...,`m(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓))ω.
2) otherwise, we trivially have that:
P |= (k`1,...,`m(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓))ω.
Hence, in both cases, we have shown that P |= f .
Hence, for any statement f ∈ seed(P ), we have shown that
P |= f . 
Lemma 3: Let P be a ground process and K be a set of
statements such that for all f ∈ K we have that P |= f . We
have that P |= f for all f ∈ H(K).
Proof. We prove this result by structural induction on the
prooftree witnessing the fact that f ∈ H(K). Let π be such a
proof tree.
Base case. The prooftree π is reduced to a leaf meaning that it
has been obtained by applying the rule CONSEQ on a statement
f ′ = (H ⇐ ) (i.e. with n = 0). We have that f = f ′σ where σ
is a substitution grounding for f ′. Moreover, by hypothesis, we
have that P |= f ′. Hence, as all variables in f ′ are universally
quantified, we have also that P |= f ′σ, i.e. P |= f .
Inductive case. We proceed by case distinction on the last rule
which has been applied.
• CONSEQ: We have that f ′ = (H ⇐ B1 . . . Bn) ∈ K, σ is
a substitution grounding for f ′ such that f = Hσ, Biσ ∈
H(K) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and skel(f ′σ) is in normal form. As
H ⇐ B1 . . . Bn ∈ K we have by hypothesis that P |=
H ⇐ B1 . . . Bn and hence P |= (H ⇐ B1 . . . Bn)σ.
By induction hypothesis we also have that P |= Biσ for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, we conclude that P |= Hσ.
• EXTEND: We have f = kuv(R, t) with ku(R, t) ∈ H(K).
By induction hypothesis, we have that P |= ku(R, t), and
it follows from the semantics of k that P |= kuv(R, t).
This allows us to conclude. 
B. Completeness
The completeness part of Theorem 1 is a consequence of
the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Let P be a ground process such that
(P, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (Q,ϕ) then
16
(A) rL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓ ∈ H(seed(P ));
(B) if ϕ `R t then kL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R, t↓) ∈ H(seed(P )).
Proof. We prove the two statements by induction on n.
We assume that the two statements hold for any index less
than n and we prove them for n. By hypothesis, we have that
(P, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (Q,ϕ), and therefore there exists ω such that:
• (L1ϕ↓, . . . , Lnϕ↓) =AC (`1, . . . , `n)ω↓; and
• skω↓ =AC tkω↓ for all k ∈ T (n).
First, we prove statement (A). We have skω↓ =AC tkω↓
for all k ∈ T (n). Therefore, there exists σ ∈ csuR,AC({sk
?
=
tk}k∈T (n)) and a substitution π such that:
1) skσ↓ =AC tkσ↓ for all k ∈ T (n); and
2) xω↓ =AC xσπ↓ for any x ∈ vars({sk, tk}k∈T (n)).
It follows that (`1, . . . , `n)ω↓ =AC (`1, . . . , `n)σπ↓. By
definition of variantsR,AC((`1, . . . , `n)σ), we know that there
exists τ ∈ variantsR,AC((`1, . . . , `n)σ) such that
(`1, . . . , `n)σπ↓ =AC (`1, . . . , `n)στ↓τ ′
for some substitution τ ′. Let f be the following statement.
r`1στ↓,...,`nστ↓ ⇐ k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)j∈R(n)
By the definition of seed(P ), we have that f ∈ seed(P ). Let
τ ′′ be the substitution that extends τ ′ by {Xj 7→ Rj}j∈R(n)
where Rj are recipes for xjω. Applying our induction hypoth-
esis, we have that k`1στ↓τ ′′,...,`j−1στ↓τ ′′(Xjτ
′′, xjστ↓τ ′′) is in
H(seed(P )) for j ∈ R(n). Therefore
r`1στ↓τ ′′,...,`nστ↓τ ′′ ∈ H(seed(P )).
We have that:
(L1ϕ↓, . . . , Lnϕ↓) =AC (`1, . . . , `n)ω↓
=AC (`1, . . . , `n)σπ↓
=AC (`1, . . . , `n)στ↓τ ′
=AC `1στ↓τ ′′, . . . , `nστ↓τ ′′
Therefore, we conclude that rL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓ ∈ H(seed(P )).
We now prove statement (B). By structural induction on the
recipe R, we show that:
kL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R,Rϕ↓) ∈ H(seed(P ))
1) If R = c is a public name, and asf =
(
kε(c, c) ⇐
)
is in the set of seed statements by definition, we have
that kε(R,Rϕ↓) = kε(c, c) ∈ H(seed(T )), and therefore
kL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R,Rϕ↓) ∈ H(seed(T )) by the EXTEND
rule.
2) If R = wj , let m be the smallest index such that
|S(m)| = j (i.e. m is the index of the action am that
outputs the content of wj) and let tm be the term such
that am = out(c, tm) for some channel c.
Let σ ∈ csuR,AC({sk
?
= tk}k∈T (m)) be such that
(`1, . . . , `n)ω↓ =AC (`1, . . . , `n)σπ↓
for some π. Let τ ∈ variantsR,AC((`1, . . . , `m, tm)σ)
and τ ′ be a substitution such that
(`1, . . . , `m, tm)ω↓ =AC (`1, . . . , `m, tm)στ↓τ ′.
Let h be the following statement:
k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(wj , tmστ↓)
⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`k−1στ↓(Xk, xkστ↓)}k∈R(m)
By definition of seed(P ), we have that h ∈ seed(P ).
For k ∈ R(m), let Rk be recipes of xkστ↓τ ′ =AC xkω↓
in the smallest possible prefix of ϕ. Let
τ ′′ = τ ′ ∪ {Xk 7→ Rk}k∈R(m).
We have that the antecedents of hτ ′′ are in H(seed(T ))
by the induction hypothesis. Therefore
k`1στ↓τ ′′,...,`mστ↓τ ′′(wj , tmστ↓τ ′′)
=AC k`1στ↓τ ′,...,`mστ↓τ ′(wj , tmστ↓τ ′)
=AC k`1ω↓,...,`mω↓(wj , tmω↓) ∈ H(seed(P )).
But (`1, . . . , `m)ω↓ is a prefix of (`1, . . . , `n)ω↓
and by the EXTEND rule, k`1ω↓,...,`nω↓(wj , tmω↓) ∈
H(seed(T )), i.e. kL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R,Rϕ↓) ∈ H(seed(T )),
which is what we had to prove.
3) If R = f(R1, . . . , Rk), let τ ∈
variantsR,AC(f(y1, . . . , yk)) and τ ′ be such that
Rϕ↓ =AC (f(y1, . . . , yk)τ)↓τ ′ and Riϕ↓ =AC yiτ↓τ ′ for
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let g be the following statement:
k`1,...,`n(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓)
⇐ {k`1,...,`n(Yj , yjτ↓)}j∈{1,...,k}
By the definition of seed(P ), we have that g ∈ seed(P ).
Let τ ′′ = ω ∪ τ ′ ∪ {Yj 7→ Rj}j∈{1,...,k}. We have
that all antecedents of gτ ′′ are in H(seed(T )) by the
induction hypothesis. Therefore, the head of gτ ′′ is also
in H(seed(T )).
This allows us to conclude the proof. 
APPENDIX
PROOFS REGARDING SATURATION
We show that the update preserved knowledge bases, and
prove Theorem 2.
Proposition 1: If K is a knowledge base and f is a statement
then K d f is a knowledge base.
Proof. A knowledge base can contain any statement except
solved deduction statements h =
(
k(R, x) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
.
Such kind of statement is not in a canonical form due to the
SHIFT rule, therefore such statement is never added to the
knowledge base. 
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A. Soundness
In this section, we prove the soundness part of Theorem 2
(i.e. item 1). The saturation procedure is a restriction of the
original procedure (as described in [18]), therefore the proof
is essentially the same as in [18], and is actually an immediate
consequence of the lemmas stated and proved below.
Lemma 5: Let P be a ground process and f be a statement.
If P |= f then P |= f⇓.
Proof. Consider a statement f .
1) First, we have to normalize all the recipes that occur in f .
This will have only an effect on H , and the resulting
statement f ′ is such that P |= f ′ since ϕ `R t implies
ϕ `R′ t when R′ = R↓.
2) Second, we apply the REMOVE rule as many times as
possible. Let us show that applying one instance of such
a rule leads to a statement f ′ such that P |= f ′. In such
a case, we have that:
• f = H ⇐ kuv(X, t), ku(Y, t), B1, . . . , Bn ‖M;
• f ′ = H ⇐ ku(Y, t), B1, . . . , Bn ‖ (Mr kuv(X, t)).
Moreover, we know that X 6∈ vars(H). Let τ be an
arbitrary substitution such that T |= ku(Y, t)τ , P |=
B1τ, . . . , P |= Bnτ . We consider the substitution τ ′ to
be identical to τ except that τ ′(X) = τ(Y ). We have
that P |= kuv(X, t)τ as well. Therefore, we have that
P |= Hτ , and this allows us to conclude that P |= f ′.
3) Third, we apply the SHIFT rule as many times as possible
when the statement f is solved. Let us show that applying
one instance of such a rule leads to a statement f ′ such
that P |= f ′. In such a case, we have that:
• f = kuv(R, t)⇐ ku(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn;
• f ′ = kuv(R⊕X, t⊕ x↓)⇐ ku(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn.
Moreover, we know that x ∈ factor(t). Let τ be an
arbitrary substitution such that
P |= ku(X,x)τ , P |= B1τ , . . ., and P |= Bnτ .
Therefore, we have P |= kuv(R, t)τ , and thus we have
P |= kuv(R⊕X, t⊕x)τ , and P |= kuv(R⊕X, t⊕x↓)τ .
This allows us to conclude that P |= f ′.
We have shown that all the rules needed for computing the
canonical form are sound and therefore T |= f⇓ whenever
T |= f . 
Lemma 6: Let P be a ground process and K be a
knowledge base. If P |= f for all f ∈ Ksolved then we have
that P |= f for all f ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
Proof. We show that both inference rules are sound.
Case: AXIOM. Immediate from the semantics of k.
Case: RES. We consider f = ku(R, t) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn and
gi = Biσ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm for 1 ≤ i ≤ n be statements such
that P |= f and P |= gi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We have to show
that
P |=
(
ku(R, t)σ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm)
Let τ be a substitution such that P |= C1τ, . . . , Cmτ . We
have that P |= C1τ, . . . , Cmτ and P |= gi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Therefore, we have that P |= Biστ with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since
P |= f , we have that P |= ku(R, t)στ as well. This allows us
to conclude that P |= kuv(R, t)στ . 
Now, we establish the soundness of each saturation rule as
defined in Figure 6.
Lemma 7: Let P be a ground process, f , g, and h be
three statements, and σ be a substitution defined as in the
RESOLUTION rule. If P |= f and P |= g then P |= hσ.
Proof. We consider the following statements:
f = H ⇐ kuv(X, t), B1, . . . , Bn ‖M
g = kw(R, t
′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
h = H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm ‖Mr {kuv(X, t)}
Moreover, we have that kuv(X, t) ∈ sel(f), g is a solved
statement but not in f+0 , and σ ∈ csuAC(ku(X, t), kw(R, t′)).
Let τ be a substitution grounding for hσ and assume that
P |= B1στ, . . . , Bmστ . We will show that P |= Hστ .
As P |= Bn+1στ, . . . , Bmστ and because P |= g, we have
that P |= kw(R, t′)στ . But kw(R, t′)στ = ku(X, t)στ , and
therefore we have that P |= kuv(X, t)στ as well. As all
antecedents of fστ are true in P and because P |= f , we
have that P |= Hστ . As τ was chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that P |= hσ. 
Lemma 8: Let P be a ground process, f , g, and h be
three statements, and σ be a substitution defined as in the
RESOLUTION+ rule. If P |= f and P |= g then P |= hσ.
Proof. The proof is similar to the former one. 
Lemma 9: Let P be a ground process, f , g and h be three
statements, and σ be a substitution defined as in the EQUATION
rule. If P |= f and P |= g then P |= hσ.
Proof. We consider the following statements:
f = ku(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
g = ku′v′(R
′, t′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
h = iu′v′(R,R
′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm
where σ ∈ csuAC(〈u, t〉, 〈u′, t′〉).
Let τ be a substitution grounding for hσ. We assume
that P |= B1στ, . . . , Bmστ . We will show that P |=
iu′v′(R,R
′)στ .
As P |= B1στ, . . . , Bnστ and because P |= f we have that
P |= ku(R, t)στ . But ku(R, t)στ = ku′(R, t)στ by choice
of σ, and therefore P |= ku′(R, t)στ , and we also have that
P |= ku′v′(R, t)στ . As P |= Bn+1στ . . . , Bmστ and because
P |= g we also obtain that P |= ku′v′(R′, t′)στ .
As P |= ku′v′(R, t)στ and P |= ku′v′(R′, t′)στ , we have
by definition that P |= iu′v′(R,R′)στ . We have shown that
the head of hστ is true in P . As τ was chosen arbitrarily, it
follows that hσ holds in P . 
Lemma 10: Let P be a ground process, f, g, and h be three
statements, and σ be a substitution defined as in the TEST rule.
If P |= f and P |= g then P |= hσ.
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Proof. We consider the following statements:
f = iu(R,R
′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
g = ru′v′ ⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
h = riu′v′(R,R
′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm
where σ ∈ csuAC(u, u′).
Let τ be a substitution grounding for hσ. We assume that
P |= B1στ, . . . , Bmστ and we show that P |= riu(R,R′)τ .
Indeed, as P |= B1στ, . . . , Bnστ and as P |= f , we have
that P |= iu(R,R′)στ . As P |= Bn+1στ, . . . , Bmστ and as
P |= g, we have that P |= ru′v′στ .
But σ ∈ csuAC(u, u′) and therefore uστ =AC u′στ . Hence,
we immediately obtain P |= riu′v′(R,R′)στ , which is what
we wanted. It follows that P |= hσ. 
Now, we establish the soundness of our update operation.
Lemma 11: Let P be a ground process, K be a knowledge
base, and g be a statement. If P |= g, and P |= f for all
f ∈ K, then P |= f for any f ∈ (K d g).
Proof. If K d g ⊆ K ∪ {g⇓}, we immediately conclude by
Lemma 5. Otherwise, we have that K d g = K ∪ {h} where:
• g⇓ = ku(R, t) ⇐ ku1(X1, x1), . . . , kun(Xn, xn) for
some R, t, u, u1, . . . , un, X1, . . . , Xn, x1, . . . , xn; and
• h = iu(R,R
′↓)⇐ ku1(X1, x1), . . . , kun(Xn, xn).
Moreover, we have that g′ ∈ conseq(Ksolved) where
g′ = ku(R
′, t)⇐ ku1(X1, x1), . . . , kun(Xn, xn).
In order to conclude, we have to show that P |= h. Let τ
be a substitution grounding for h such that the antecedents of
hτ are true in P . As the antecedents of hτ are the same as the
antecedents of g⇓τ and those of g′τ , and as P |= g and P |= g′
(thanks to Lemma 6), we have that P |= ku(R, t)τ , P |=
ku(R
′, t)τ , and P |= ku(R′↓, t)τ as well. But this immediately
implies that P |= iu(R,R′↓)τ (the head of hτ ). As τ was
chosen arbitrarily, it follows that P |= h. 
Lemma 12: Let P be a ground process and K be a
knowledge base such that P |= f for all f ∈ K. We have
that P |= H for all H ∈ He(K).
Proof. This result is proved by structural induction on the
derivation tree witnessing the fact that H ∈ He(K). 
B. Completeness
In this section we prove the completeness part of Theorem 2.
The first two items are immediate consequences of Theorem 1
and Lemma 27 proved below. The third item follows from the
second item of Theorem 2 and Lemma 25 proved below.
1) Preliminaries: We start by introducing a variant of H,
calledH′, where uses of f+0 clauses is constrained. Derivations
establishing H ∈ H′(K) (for some ground fact H) are
essentially derivations of H ∈ H(K), decorated with + and
− annotations. In addition to it, we impose that EXTEND rules
are only applied in H′− derivations, and never repeatedly; this
is done through s and e annotations.
Definition 16: Given a solved knowledge base K, we define
H′(K), H′+(K), H′−(K), H′s−(K) and H′e−(K) to be the
smallest sets of ground facts such that:
• H′−(K) = H′s−(K) ∪H′e−(K),
• H′(K) = H′−(K) ∪H′+(K), and
STD
f =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ K \ f+0
B1σ, . . . , Bnσ ∈ H′(K) with skel(fσ) in normal form
Hσ ∈ H′s−(K)
SUM
f =
(
H ⇐ B1, B2
)
∈ f+0
B1σ,B2σ ∈ H′(K) with skel(fσ) in normal form
Hσ ∈ H′+(K)
EXTEND’
ku(R, t) ∈ H′s−(K)
kuv(R, t) ∈ H′e−(K)
The sets of derivations associated to H(K), H′(K), H′−(K),
H′s−(K), H′e−(K) and H′+(K) are respectively denoted by
Π(K), Π′(K), Π′−(K), Π
′s
−(K), Π
′e
−(K) and Π
′
+(K).
We consider a solved knowledge base K, and we introduce
the following notation:
1) the extraction extract(π) of a derivation tree π ∈ Π′(K)
is the set of derivation trees {π} in case π ∈ Π′−(K);
and extract(π1) ∪ extract(π2) where π1 and π2 are the
immediate sub-derivation trees of π in case π ∈ Π′+(K).
2) the size S(π) of a derivation tree π ∈ Π′(K) is the
number of nodes occurring in π excluding EXTEND’
nodes.
3) the real world W(π) of a derivation tree π ∈ Π′(K)
whose root is labeled with kw(R, t) is w in case π 6∈
Π′e−(K), and W(π) =W(π′) where π′ is the immediate
sub-derivation tree of π otherwise.
4) the l-restricted size Ŝl(π) of a derivation tree π ∈ Π′(K)
whose immediate sub-derivation tree are π1, . . . , πn is∑
1≤i≤n
{S(πi) | W( πi) ≥ l}
Such a measure allows us to define the set H(l,κ)e (K) with
l, κ ∈ N as the smallest set of facts that:
• contains any H ∈ H′(K) which has a derivation tree
π ∈ Π′(K) such that Ŝl(π) ≤ κ; and
• that is closed under the same rules as He.
Remark 1: The l-restricted size information in the following
proofs is not used to prove the completeness of the saturation
but to prove the correction of the algorithm (Theorem 3).
So for a first reading of the proof, it is safe to skip these
information and to read He(K) instead of H(l,κ)e (K).
We start the proofs with a technical lemma which will allow
us to exploit the flexibility in how a sum can be obtained.
Lemma 13: Let K be a solved knowledge base, and π ∈
Π′+(K) with its root labeled with ku(R,
⊕n
i=1 ti) (and no ti
is a sum). Let k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. There exists a partition of
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{1, . . . , n} in A, B, and a derivation tree π′ ∈ Π′+(K) with
its root labeled with ku(R′,
⊕n
i=1 ti) such that:
• k ∈ A;
• R =AC R
′;
• S(π′) = S(π);
• the immediate sub-derivation trees of π′ are:
– π′1 ∈ Π′−(K) with root h′1 = ku(RA,
⊕
i∈A ti); and
– π′2 ∈ Π′(K) with root h′2 = ku(RB ,
⊕
i∈B ti).
Proof. We proceed by induction on S(π). Let π1 and π2
be the immediate sub-derivations of π, respectively labeled
with h1 and h2. We may assume w.l.o.g. that tk occurs in h1.
If π1 ∈ Π′−(K), we conclude immediately. We now consider
that π1 ∈ Π′+(K). We apply our induction hypothesis on π1
to get πa ∈ Π′−(K) and πb ∈ Π′(K) labeled respectively with
ha and hb, and such that S(πa) + S(πb) + 1 = S(π1). We
apply SUM on πb and π2 to obtain π3.
We can conclude with π′1 being πa, π
′
2 being π3, and π
′
the result of applying SUM on π′1 and π
′
2. We can check that
S(π′) = S(π′1) + S(π′2) + 1 = S(π). 
Now, after a simple observation on EXTEND (Proposition 2),
we establish that H and H′ coincide (Lemma 14).
Proposition 2: Let K be a solved knowledge base such
that f+0 ⊆ K. If ku(R, t) ∈ H′(K), then kuv(R, t) ∈ H′(K)
for any v.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation π estab-
lishing that ku(R, t) ∈ H′(K). We distinguish three cases:
1) Case π ∈ Π′s−(K). In such a case, we conclude by
applying rule EXTEND’ to extend the world with v.
2) Case π ∈ Π′e−(K). In such a case, its last rule is already
EXTEND’, extending some world u1 to u1u2 = u; we
conclude by modifying this last rule to directly extend
u1 with u2v.
3) Case π ∈ Π′+(K). In such a case, its two premises are of
the form ku(Ri, ti) with i ∈ {1, 2}. By induction hypoth-
esis, we have that kuv(Ri, ti) ∈ H′(K) for i ∈ {1, 2},
which allows us to conclude using rule SUM. 
Lemma 14: Let K be a solved knowledge base such that
f+0 ⊆ K. We have that H(K) = H′(K).
Proof. The fact that H′(K) ⊆ H(K) is immediate. For
the other direction, we have to show that any derivation tree
π ∈ Π(K) can be turned into a derivation tree in Π′(K) with
the same conclusion. Let π be a derivation tree in H(K) with
root labeled with H . We proceed by case analysis on the last
rule of π.
1) Case π ends with EXTEND. In such a case, we apply the
induction hypothesis to its immediate sub-derivation, and
conclude by Proposition 2.
2) Case π ends with CONSEQ. In such a case, let f be the
statement and B1, . . . , Bn the premisses involved in this
last step. Applying our induction hypothesis, we know
that there are derivation tree π′1, . . . , π
′
n ∈ Π′(K) labeled
respectively with B1, . . . , Bn. We then distinguish two
cases:
• If f /∈ f+0 we can use STD on π′1, . . . , π′n to obtain
H ∈ H′−(K).
• If f ∈ f+0 , we proceed similarly but using rule SUM
instead of STD. 
Proposition 3: Let K be a solved knowledge base, and
let f =
(
kuv(R, t) ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
)
a statement such that
f ∈ conseq(K) and τ be a substitution grounding for f such
that skel(fτ) is in normal form, and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
that Ciτ has a derivation tree πi ∈ H(K). Then kuv(R, t)τ
has a derivation tree π ∈ H(K).
Proof. By induction on the proof tree of f ∈ conseq(K).
• If the AXIOM rule was used, we have that Ci = ku(R, t)
for some i and, by hypothesis, Ciτ ∈ H(K). Using the
EXTENDK rule we conclude.
• If the RES rule was used, we have that there exists a
solved statement g =
(
ku′(R
′, t′) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ K
and a substitution σ such that ku(R, t) = ku′(R′, t′)σ
and Biσ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm ∈ conseq(K) (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
We assume w.l.o.g. that σ only instantiates first-order
variables that occur in u′, and t′. Therefore we have
that skel(Biστ) is in normal form as only subterm of
u′σ(= u) and t′σ(= t) may occur in it, u, t are in
normal form. Since skel(Biστ) is in normal form, we
can apply our induction hypothesis, and conclude that
Biστ ∈ H(K).
As
(
ku′(R
′, t′) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ K and skel(Biστ)
are all in normal form, it follows that ku′(R′, t′)στ =
ku(R, t)τ ∈ H(K) with derivation tree π. Using the
EXTENDK rule we conclude. 
We continue showing several useful properties on identity
formulas in He(K).
Lemma 15: Let K be a solved knowledge base.
1) If iw(R1, R2⊕R3) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K) then iw(R1⊕R2, R3) ∈
H(l,κ)e (K).
2) If iw(R1, R2) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K) and iw(R2, R3) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K)
then iw(R1, R3) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K).
3) If iw(R1, R2) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K) then iw(R2, R1) ∈
H(l,κ)e (K).
Proof. We prove the three items separately.
1) We apply CONG using iw(R2, R2) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K) (obtained
with REFL) to get iw(R1 ⊕ R2, R2 ⊕ R3 ⊕ R2) ∈
H(l,κ)e (K), and conclude using MOD-I.
2) Using CONG, we get iw(R1⊕R2, R2⊕R3) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K).
We apply CONG again using iw(R2, R2) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K)
(obtained with REFL), and conclude using MOD-I.
3) We apply twice CONG using iw(R1, R1) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K)
and iw(R2, R2) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K) (obtained with REFL) to
get iw(R1 ⊕R1 ⊕R2, R2 ⊕R1 ⊕R2) ∈ H(l,κ)e (K), and
conclude using MOD-I. 
Proposition 4: Let K be a knowledge base. If
kw(R[T ]p, t) ∈ He(K) and iw(T, T ′) ∈ He(K), then
kw(R[T
′]p, t) ∈ He(K).
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Proof. By induction on the context R.
Base case. As kw(R, t) ∈ He(K), it follows that there exist
R′′ such that
kw(R
′′, t) ∈ H(K) (1)
and such that iw(R,R′′) ∈ He(K). But iw(R,R′) ∈ He(K)
and therefore, by Lemma 15, we have that
iw(R
′′, R′) ∈ He(K). (2)
Using Equations 1 and 2 we immediately obtain by the
definition of He that kw(R′, t) ∈ He(K).
Induction case. By application of the CONG rule on the top
symbol. 
Definition 17: We write w v w′ whenever w is a prefix of
w′: i.e. there exists `1, . . . , `n such that w′ =AC `1, . . . , `n and
w =AC `1, . . . , `m for some 0 ≤ m ≤ n.
2) Dealing with saturation: The following Lemma is a
technical one which will be used in the proof of Lemma 17
and of Lemma 21.
Lemma 16: Let K be a saturated knowledge base, and f
be an unsolved statement in K such that:
f =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ‖M
)
and Bi = kwi(Xi, ti). Let σ be a substitution such that
• σ is grounding for f ,
• skel(fσ) is in normal form, and
• for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n there exist πi ∈ Π′(Ksolved) to derive
Biσ and if Bi ∈M then πi ∈ Π′−(Ksolved).
Then we have that, during the saturation of K, there was an up-
date with a statement h =
(
H ′ ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′n′ ‖M′
)
where
B′i = kw′i(X
′
i, t
′
i), and there is a substitution ω grounding for
h such that:
1) skel(hω) is in normal form;
2) H ′ω = Hσ;
3) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n′, there exist π′i ∈ Π′(Ksolved) to derive
B′iω, and if B
′
i ∈Marked′ then π′i ∈ Π′−(Ksolved);
4)
∑
i∈{1,...,n} S(πi) >
∑
i∈{1,...,n′} S(π′i);
5) Let π ∈ Π′(Ksolved) be the derivation tree of Hσ ∈ H(K)
with sub-derivation trees π1, . . . , πn and π′ ∈ Π′(Ksolved)
be the derivation tree of H ′ω ∈ H(K) whose sub-
derivation trees are π′1, . . . , π
′
n′ . For all l we have that
Ŝl(π′) ≤ Ŝl(π).
Proof. Let Bj = kwj (Xj , tj) = sel(f).
Case: πj ∈ Π′−(Ksolved). We consider the last node of πj or
the previous node if the last node is EXTEND’ with some word
v′. Let
g =
(
ku′(R
′, t′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
∈ Ksolved,
g 6= f+0 and σ′ the statement and substitution of this node (we
have u′v′σ′ = wjσ). Note that by definition of a derivation
tree and S(.), we have that S(πj) = 1 +
∑
i∈{n+1,...,m} π
′
i
where (π′i)n+1≤i≤m are the immediate sub-derivation tree
of πj and also proofs of (Biσ) ∈ Π′(Ksolved). As σ ∪ σ′
is a unifier of kwj (Xj , tj) and ku′(R
′, t′), it follows that
τ ∈ csuAC(kwj (Xj , tj), ku′(R′, t′)) exists. Therefore σ ∪ σ′
must be an instance of the one element of the complete set of
unifier, let ω be a substitution such that σ ∪ σ′ = τω.
As K has been saturated by selecting Bj and g 6= f+0 , it
follows that the RESOLUTION saturation rule was applied to
f and g. We consider h the resulting statement from which K
has been updated:
h =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bj−1, Bj+1, . . . , Bm ‖M
)
τ.
We have that ω is a substitution grounding for h, that skel(hω)
is in normal form, that π′i ∈ Π′(Ksolved) is a derivation tree
for Biτω ∈ H′(Ksolved) for i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . ,m},
and that ∑
i∈{1,...,j−1,j+1,...,m}
S(π′i) <
∑
i∈1...n
S(πi).
Therefore, Condition 4 is satisfied. Similarly, Condition 5 is
also satisfied: when W(πi) ≥ l we have a strict inequality
otherwise we have an equality as for i ∈ {n + 1, . . . ,m},
W(πi) < l.
Finally, the atoms Bi for i ∈ {n+1, . . . ,m} are not marked
(g is a solved statement), while, by hypothesis, the others (Bi
for i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , n} ) are marked only if they
have a derivation tree in Π′−(Ksolved). Therefore, Condition 3
is also satisfied.
Case πj ∈ Π′+(Ksolved). The case where rigid(tj) = ⊥ is sim-
ilar to the previous one (since there is no marking). Otherwise,
we apply Lemma 13 on πj and the factor rigid(tj) (the one
chosen during the saturation) to get kw(Rx, tx) of derivation
tree πx ∈ Π′−(Ksolved) and kw(Ry, ty) of derivation tree πy ∈
Π′(Ksolved) such that kw(Rx ⊕Ry, tx ⊕ ty) =AC kw(Rj , tj)σ
and rigid(tj) is part of txσ. We also have S(πj) = 1+πx+πy .
Let σ+ ∈ csuAC(kw(Rj , tj), kw(X⊕Y, x⊕y)) such that tx
is an instance of xσ+, ty an instance of yσ+, Rx an instance
of Xσ+ and Ry an instance of Y σ+. We denote by ω the
substitution such that σ+ω = σ
As K has been saturated by selecting Bj , it follows that
the RESOLUTION+ saturation rule was applied to f and f+0
with σ+ as unifier.
We consider h′ the resulting statement from which K has
been updated:(
H ⇐ Bx, By, B1, . . . , Bj−1, Bj+1, . . . , Bn ‖M∪{Bx}
)
σ+
where Bx is marked, By is not, and the other keep their status.
We have that ω is a substitution grounding for h such that
skel(hω) is in normal form, that Biσ+ω has a derivation
tree π′i ∈ Π′(Ksolved) for i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . ,m}
and that S(π′x) + S(π′y) +
∑
i∈{1,...,j−1,j+1,...,m} S(π′i) <∑
i∈1...n S(πi). Therefore, our Condition 4 is satisfied.
Finally, the atoms Bi for i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , n}
are marked only if they have a derivation tree in Π′−(Ksolved).
Therefore our Condition 3 is also satisfied. Similarly, Con-
dition 5 is also satisfied: when W(πi) ≥ l we have a
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strict inequality otherwise we have an equality as for i ∈
{n+ 1, . . . ,m}, W(πi) < l. 
Remark 2: Note that the derivation trees of the premisses
of h are the ones of the premisses of f except that the
derivation tree of Bj has been replaced by all its immediate
sub-derivation trees.
Lemma 17: Let K be a saturated knowledge base and f ∈
K be a statement such that
f =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ‖M
)
where H is either iw(R,R′), riw(R,R′) or rw. Let σ be a
substitution grounding for f such that
• skel(fσ) is in normal form,
• for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n there exists a derivation tree
πi ∈ Π′(Ksolved) of Biσ and if Bi ∈ marked then
πi ∈ Π′−(Ksolved).
For all l we have that
Hσ ∈ H(l,κ)e (Ksolved)
where κ = Ŝl(π) where π is the derivation tree whose
immediate sub-derivation trees are the πi’s
Proof. Let G =
∑
i∈{1,...,n} S(πi). We prove the lemma by
induction on G.
If f is a solved statement, the conclusion is immediate by
the definition of H(l,κ)e .
Otherwise, we apply Lemma 16 on f and σ. We get the
existence of ω and h = (H ′ ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′m ‖M′) such that
K has been updated by h and which have the six properties
stated in Lemma 16. Let h⇓ = (H ′′ ⇐ B′′1 , . . . , B′′m′ ‖M′′)
such that {B′′1 , . . . , B′′m′} ⊆ {B′1, . . . , B′m}. Since Property 1
grants that skel(H ′′) is in normal form and that canonization
rules can only replace the term of the head by a subterm, the
skeleton of the considered predicates h⇓ is still in normal form
and then is not removed: it is added in the knowledge base
by the update. Then due to Property 3, M′′ corresponds to
the premisses which has a derivation tree in Π′−(Ksolved) and
due to the Property 4 the measure is strictly smaller so we can
apply our induction hypothesis on h⇓ to get H ′′ω ∈ H(l,κ
′)
e
with κ′ ≤ κ due to the property 5 and the set inclusion.
Finally, according to the Property 2 we have H ′ω = Hσ
and by definition of ⇓, we have H ′↓ω = H ′′ω, therefore,
by definition of H(l,κ)e , we have Hσ ∈ H(l,κ)e . 
Definition 18: We say that a term t has a root variable if
there exists a term t′ and a variable x such that t = t′ ⊕ x or
t = x.
Lemma 18: Let K be a saturated knowledge base. If
h = kw(R, t) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ∈ Ksolved has been obtained
by applying RESOLUTION or RESOLUTION+ between a VIP
statement f and g ∈ Ksolved then t has no root variable.
Proof. Recall that a VIP statement always stems from a
resolution against a solved statement of an unsolved VIP
statement, except for the initial f+1 and f
+
2 VIP statements.
Let f = kw(X + Y, x) ⇐ kw(X,x ⊕ u), kw(Y, u) ‖M ∈
f+1 . The resolution can only be done on kw(X,x⊕u) against
some g = kv(R′, t1 ⊕ t2) ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′n where neither t1
or t2 has a root variable (the SHIFT rule prevents such solved
statement to be added in the database). Hence, x is substituted
by a term which does not have a root variable. Then no
further substitution can lead to a term with a root variable: the
property holds for any solved VIP statement whose ancestor
is in f+1 .
Let f be a solved VIP statement whose ancestor is kw(X+
Y, x+y)⇐ kw(X,x⊕u), kw(Y, y⊕u) ‖M ∈ f+2 . By symme-
try, assume that resolution has been performed on kw(X,x⊕
u) ∈ f+2 with some substitution σ1 and another solved state-
ment. The direct child of the ancestor is f1 = kw(Xσ+Y, xσ+
y) ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′m, kwσ1(Y, y ⊕ uσ1) ‖M′. The previous
argument of the f+1 case leads to xσ has no root variable. Let
f2, . . . , fn be the VIP children obtained by resolution on fi−1
and a solved statement with substitution σ2, . . . , σn but where
sel(fi−1) 6= kwσ1...σi(Y, y ⊕ u(σ1 . . . σi)). However all these
fi are unsolved since y ⊕ u(σ1 . . . σi) is not a variable. Once
a resolution is done against the literal kw(Y, y ⊕ u(σ1 . . . σn)
with substitution σ′ the previous argument leads to yσ′ having
no root variable. Since neither x nor y have a root variable,
t has no root variable. Therefore, the property also holds for
any solved VIP statement whose ancestor is in f+2 . 
Lemma 19: Let fn be a solved VIP statement whose
ancestor is f0 = (kw(X⊕Y, t)⇐ B0,1, B0,2 ‖ {B0,1, B0,2}) ∈
f+1 ∪f
+
2 and fi are the intermediate statements. By symmetry,
we consider that sel(f0) = B0,1 and therefore that there exists
B1,2 = B0,2σ in the premisses of f1. If Bi,2 exists in the
premisses of fi and sel(fi) 6= Bi,2 the resulting statement has
a premisse Bi+1,2. The statement fn has no premisse Bn,2.
Proof. We consider two possible cases for the ancestor.
• If f0 = kw(X + Y, x + y) ⇐ kw(X,x ⊕ u), kw(Y, y ⊕
u) ‖M ∈ f+2 we observe that none of the two premisses
are solved. As fn is solved both premisses must have
been removed by resolution and the result is immediate.
• If f0 = kw(X + Y, x)⇐ kw(X,x⊕ u), kw(Y, u) ‖M ∈
f+1 , resolution can only be performed on kw(X,x ⊕ u)
against some g = kv(R′, t1 ⊕ t2) ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′n where
neither t1 nor t2 has a root variable. This implies that u
will be substituted by a non variable term t′. Therefore
at least one resolution on kw(Y, t′) is required to get a
solved statement. 
Lemma 20: Let K be a saturated knowledge base and h a
solved statement
h =
(
ku(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
such that h⇓ =
(
ku(R
′, t′) ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′m
)
, t is in normal
form and
• either h⇓ ∈ Ksolved,
• or g =
(
ku(R
′′, t′) ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′m
)
∈ conseq(Ksolved)
and h′ =
(
iu(R
′↓, R′′↓) ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′m
)
∈ Ksolved for
some R′′.
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Let σ be a substitution grounding for h such that skel(hσ) is
in normal form, and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have that Biσ has
a derivation tree πi ∈ Π′(Ksolved). We have that
(ku(R, t))σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
Proof. First note that by definition of the canonical form
{B′1, . . . , B′m} ⊆ {B1, . . . , Bn} and σ is grounding for h⇓
too. We proceed by induction on the number of rules which
have been applied to get h⇓ from h.
1) Base case: h⇓ = h.
a) If h⇓ is in K, we immediately conclude.
b) Otherwise, by applying Proposition 3 to g and σ, we
have that
ku(R
′′, t′)σ ∈ H(Ksolved).
Furthermore, as h′ ∈ Ksolved and as all antecedents
B′1σ, . . . , B
′
mσ of h
′σ are in H(Ksolved), we have that
iu(R
′↓, R′′↓)σ ∈ H(Ksolved).
It immediately follows that
ku(R
′, t′)σ ∈ He(Ksolved),
which is what we had the prove since ku(R′, t′)σ =
ku(R, t)σ.
2) If the rule REMOVE has been applied, the conclusion is
immediate as REMOVE only remove premises.
3) If there is a renormalization of the recipe, we conclude
with MOD-I and EQ. CONSEQ.
4) If the rule SHIFT has be applied to h = ku(R, t) ⇐
kw(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn for some w such that w v u to
get h′ = ku(R ⊕ X, t ⊕ x↓) ⇐ kw(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn.
By induction hypothesis, we have ku(R⊕X, t⊕ x↓)σ ∈
He(Ksolved). By definition of He, there is R′′′ such that
kuσ(R
′′′, t⊕x↓σ) ∈ H(Ksolved) and iuσ(R′′′, R⊕Xσ) ∈
He(Ksolved). We distinguish two cases.
• If t 6= x, since we also have ku(X,x)σ ∈ H(Ksolved),
we get by the rule CONSEQ on f+0 that kuσ(R
′′′ ⊕
Xσ, ((t ⊕ x↓) ⊕ x)σ) ∈ H(Ksolved) (and (t ⊕ x↓) ⊕
x =AC t). From iuσ(R′′′, R ⊕ Xσ) ∈ He(Ksolved),
iu(X,X)σ ∈ He(Ksolved) and the CONG with ⊕, we
get iuσ(R′′′⊕Xσ, (R⊕X⊕X)σ) ∈ He(Ksolved). From
MOD-I, we get iuσ(R′′′ ⊕ Xσ,Rσ) ∈ He(Ksolved).
Finally from kuσ(R′′′ ⊕ Xσ, ((t ⊕ x↓) ⊕ x)σ) ∈
H(Ksolved), applying EQ. CONSEQ., we obtain that
ku(R, t)σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
• If t = x, from kuσ(R′′′, 0) ∈ H(Ksolved) and
since the base is saturated and contains kw(0, 0), rule
EQUATION has been applied between kw(0, 0) ⇐
and f the statement of the root node of the deriva-
tion tree of kuσ(R′′′, 0) ∈ H(Ksolved). This leads
to iuσ(R′′′, 0) ∈ H(Ksolved). By Lemma 15, from
iuσ(R
′′′, 0) ∈ He(Ksolved) and iuσ(R′′′, R ⊕ Xσ) ∈
He(Ksolved), we get iu(R,X)σ ∈ He(Ksolved). Since
ku(X,x)σ ∈ H(Ksolved), we conclude. 
Lemma 21: Let K be a saturated knowledge base and f ∈
K be a statement such that
f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ‖M
)
and Bi = kwi(Xi, ti). Let σ be a substitution grounding for f
such that skel(fσ) is in normal form, and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
we have that Biσ has a derivation tree πi in Π′(Ksolved), and
if Bi ∈M then πi ∈ Π′−(Ksolved). We have that
(kw(R, t))σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
Moreover, if f ∈ f+1 ∪ f
+
2 , we have for all l that Ŝl(π) ≤
Ŝl(π1) + Ŝl(π2).
Proof. Let G =
∑
i∈{1,...,n} S(πi). We prove the lemma
by induction on G with a stronger assumption to prove
the measure on f+1 and f
+
2 . If f is a VIP statement, from
(kw(R, t))σ ∈ He(Ksolved), we extract the derivation tree π
of (kw(R′, t))σ ∈ H′(Ksolved) with R′↓ = R↓ whose root is
hf = Hf ⇐ Bf1 , . . . , Bfm, σf and π
f
i ∈ Π′(Ksolved) derivation
trees of Bfi σ
f , then for all n we have that
Ŝl(π) ≤
∑
{i|W(πi)≥l∧∃j, πi=πfj }
S(πi)+∑
{i|W(πi)≥l∧¬∃j, πi=πfj }
Ŝl(πi).
Finally, we prove the assertion for f+1 and f
+
2 by using
Lemma 19.
Base case. If f is a solved statement, the conclusion is
immediate by the definitions of H and He: when f is solved,
we have πi = π
f
i , so the inequality of the measure is just
Ŝl(π) ≤
∑
{i|W(πi)≥l} S(πi) which is the definition of Ŝl(π).
Induction case. If f is not solved, we apply Lemma 16 to
get h, ω and π′i derivation trees of B
′
iω where
h =
(
ku(Rh, th)⇐ B′1, . . . , B′m ‖M′
)
such that K has been updated by h and which
have the five properties stated in Lemma 16. Let
h⇓ = (ku(R′h, t′h) ⇐ B′′1 , . . . , B′′m′ ‖M′′) such that
{B′′1 , . . . , B′′m′} ⊆ {B′1, . . . , B′m}. Since Property 1 grants
that skel(hω) is in normal form and that the SHIFT rule
cannot produce non normal skeletons while the other rule
does not alter skel(ku(R′h, t
′
h)), h⇓ is not removed.
1) Case where h is not solved. Due to Property 3, M′′
corresponds to the premisses which has a derivation tree
in Π′−(Ksolved) and due to the Property 4 the measure is
strictly smaller so we can apply our induction hypothesis
on h⇓ to get ku(R′h, t′h)ω ∈ He(Ksolved). Finally, accord-
ing to the Property 2, we have ku(Rh, th)ω = kw(R, t)σ
and by definition of ⇓ when the statement is not solved,
we have ku(R′h↓, t′h)ω = ku(Rh, th)ω, therefore, by
definition of He, we have ku(R, t)ω ∈ He(Ksolved).
Finally, we consider that f is a VIP statement. In that case,
th cannot be of the form t⊕ x according to Lemma 18,
so the rule SHIFT is not applied. From our induction
hypothesis, we have
Ŝl(π) ≤
∑
{i|∃j, π′i=π
f
j }
S(π′i) +
∑
{i|¬∃j, π′i=π
f
j }
S(π′i).
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From Remark 2, since ∀x,S(x) > Ŝl(x), we have
Ŝl(π) ≤
∑
{i|W(πi)≥l∧∃j, πi=πfj }
S(πi)+∑
{i|W(πi)≥l∧¬∃j, πi=πfj }
Ŝl(πi).
2) Case where h is solved. If f is a VIP statement, due to
Lemma 18 no SHIFT rule has been used and by definition
h is a VIP statement, so h⇓ has been added to K. We can
then conclude since h⇓ is just the renormalization of the
head and the removal of some premisses (with Remark 2
of Lemma 16, we have Ŝl(π) ≤
∑
i S(πi)). If f is not a
VIP statement, we conclude by Lemma 20. 
The following lemma will be used in the proof of Theorem 3
but is not used to prove the completeness.
Lemma 22: Let K be a saturated knowledge base. If
ru ∈ H(Ksolved), iu(R,R′) ∈ H(Ksolved) then there exist a
derivation tree π ∈ Π′(Ksolved) of iu(R,R′) and riu(R,R′) ∈
H(|u|,κ)e (Ksolved) with κ = Ŝ|u|(π).
Proof. As ru ∈ H(Ksolved), there exists a solved state-
ment f =
(
rv ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ Ksolved and a substitution
σ grounding for f such that skel(fσ) in normal form and
Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved) with derivation tree πi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and such that u = vσ.
As iu(R,R′) ∈ H(Ksolved), there exists, by Lemma 14, π ∈
Π′(Ksolved) of iu(R,R′). π is such that there exists at its root
or below the EXTEND’ root node a solved statement
g =
(
iw(T, T
′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
and a substitution τ grounding for g such that skel(gτ) is in
normal form, and Biτ ∈ H(Ksolved) with derivation tree πi
for all n + 1 ≤ i ≤ m and such that u w u′ w wτ , R = Tτ
and R′ = T ′τ .
As vσ = u w wτ , it follows that v = v0v1 such that v0 and
w are unifiable (σ∪τ is such a unifier). Let ω ∈ csuAC(v0, w)
and let θ be such that σ ∪ τ = ω ◦ θ.
As the knowledge base is saturated, the TEST saturation rule
must have fired for f and g and therefore K must have been
updated by h where
h =
(
(riv(T, T
′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)ω
)
.
We have that skel(hθ) is in normal form, and therefore skel(h)
is in normal form too. As h is not a deduction fact, and T , T ′
are in normal form, the update must have simply added h to
K and therefore h ∈ K.
We have that Biωθ = Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and that Biωθ = Biτ ∈ H(Ksolved) for all n+1 ≤ i ≤ m with
derivation tree πi. By applying Lemma 17 to the statement h
and the substitution θ (note that its head is in normal form and
|wi| < |u| for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), we obtain that riv(T, T ′)ωθ↓ =
riu(R,R
′)↓ and therefore riu(R,R′) ∈ H(|u|,κ)e (Ksolved) with
κ ≤
∑
i∈{n+1,...,m} S(πi) = Ŝ|u|(π). 
Lemma 23: Let K be a saturated knowledge base. If there is
a derivation tree π in Π′−(Ksolved) of ku(R, t) and a derivation
tree π′ in Π′−(Ksolved) of kuv(R
′, t) then for all l we have
that iw(R,R′) ∈ H(l,κ)e (Ksolved) for some w v uv with κ ≤
Ŝl(π) + Ŝl(π′).
Proof. Let u = `1, . . . , `k and v = `k+1, . . . , `l. As
ku(R, t) ∈ H(Ksolved), it follows from its derivation tree that
there exist
f =
(
kw(S, s)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ Ksolved
and a substitution σ grounding for f such that skel(fσ) is in
normal form, Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of derivation tree
πi and kw(S, s)σ = ku′(R, t) for some u′ v u a prefix of u.
Similarly, as kuv(R′, t) ∈ H(Ksolved), it follows that there
exist
f ′ =
(
kw′(S
′, s′)⇐ B′1, . . . , B′m
)
∈ Ksolved
and a substitution σ′ grounding for f ′ such that skel(f ′σ′) is
in normal form, B′iσ ∈ H(Ksolved) (1 ≤ i ≤ m) of derivation
tree π′i and kw′(S
′, s′)σ′ = ku′′(R
′, t) for u′′ v uv a prefix
of uv.
We have that wσ v u, which trivially implies wσ v
uv. We also have w′σ′ v uv. Let w = `′1, . . . , `′p and
w′ = `′′1 , . . . , `
′′
q and let r = min{p, q}. We have that
(`′1, . . . , `
′
r)σ = (`
′′
1 , . . . , `
′′
r )σ
′.
We have that σ ∪ σ′ is a unifier of
k`′1,...,`′r ( , s) and k`′′1 ,...,`′′r ( , s
′), it follows that
τ ∈ csuAC(k`′1,...,`′r ( , s), k`′′1 ,...,`′′r ( , s
′)) exists. As K
is saturated and f, f ′ 6= f+0 , it follows that the statement
h =
(
i`′1,...,`′r (S, S
′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn, B′1, . . . , B′m
)
τ
resulting from applying the EQUATION saturation rule to f
and f ′ has been generated during the saturation process. The
knowledge base has been updated with this statement. Since
we know that skel(fσ) and skel(f ′σ′) are in normal form, we
have that skel(h) is in normal form, and therefore h is in K
(since S and S′ are necessarily in normal form).
As σ ∪ σ′ is a unifier of k`′1,...,`′r ( , s) and k`′′1 ,...,`′′r ( , s
′)
and as τ ∈ csuAC(k`′1,...,`′r ( , s), k`′′1 ,...,`′′r ( , s
′)), it follows
that there exists ω such that σ ∪ σ′ = τω.
We have that ω is grounding for h and that
B1τω, . . . , Bnτω,B
′
1τω, . . . , B
′
mτω ∈ H(Ksolved) with
derivation trees π1, . . . , πn, π′1, . . . , π
′
m and∑
{i|W(πi)≥l}
S(πi) +
∑
{i|W(π′i)≥l}
S(π′i) = Ŝl(π) + Ŝl(π′)
where Bi = kwi(Xi, xi) and B
′
i = kw′i(X
′
i, x
′
i). Therefore, we
have by Lemma 17 that
i`′1,...,`′r (S, S
′)τω = i`′1σ,...,`′rσ(R,R
′) ∈ H(l,κ)e (Ksolved).
where κ ≤
∑
{i|W(πi)≥l} S(πi). As (`
′
1, . . . , `
′
r)σ is a prefix
of uv, we conclude. 
Lemma 24: Let K be a saturated knowledge base. Let
{kwi(Ri, ti) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be a set of deduction statement
such that πi ∈ Π′−(Ksolved) is a derivation tree for kwi(Ri, ti),⊕
i∈{1,...,n} ti↓ = 0 and wi ∈ {u, uv} for some u, v. We
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have that iuv(
⊕
Ri, 0) ∈ H(l,κ)e (Ksolved) for all l and with
κ ≤
∑
i Ŝl(πi).
Proof. We denote kwi(Ri, ti) by Ki. W.l.o.g. for all i,
we suppose that ti =
⊕
1≤j≤s(i) t
j
i . We prove this lemma
by induction on
∑
i s(i). If there is some kwi(Ri, 0), from
the seed, we have kwi(0, 0) which has a derivation tree π0
in Π′−(Ksolved) and Ŝl(π0) = 0. By Lemma 23, we get
iw(Ri, 0) ∈ H(l,κ)e (Ksolved) with κ ≤ Ŝl(πi) + Ŝl(π0). We
conclude by induction hypothesis on {Kp|p 6= i} and by use
the CONG rule with ⊕.
Otherwise, since
⊕
i ti↓ = 0, there exist at least Kk of
derivation tree πk, Kj of derivation tree πj such that tk =
t′s ⊕ t′k and tj = t′s ⊕ t′j for some t′s, t′k, t′j . Let ts be the t′s
of maximal size which satisfies the former relation. We define
Sk to be the set {i|
⊕
i t
i
k = ts} and define Sj similarly.
If tk = tj , from Lemma 23, we get iw(Rk, Rj) ∈
H(l,κ)e (Ksolved) with κ ≤ Ŝl(πk) + Ŝl(πj). From Lemma 15,
we get iw(Rk ⊕Rj , 0) ∈ H(l,κ)e (Ksolved). If the set contained
other predicate than Kk and Kj , we use our induction hypoth-
esis on the set {Ki|i /∈ {k, j}}, we get iuv(
⊕
i/∈{k,j}Ri, 0) ∈
H(l,κ
′)
e (Ksolved) with κ′ ≤
∑
i/∈{k,j} Ŝl(πi). Then we con-
clude by applying the CONG rule with ⊕, on the two above
identical predicates. Otherwise we conclude directly.
Otherwise tk 6= tj . We denote by tN =
⊕
i/∈Sk t
i
k ⊕∑
i/∈Sk t
′i
j . We apply Lemma 21 on the suitable f
+
1 or f
+
2
statement (f+1 if ts = tk or ts = tj , f
+
2 otherwise) and σ
+ :
x 7→ tj , y 7→ tk. We get kuv(Rj ⊕Rk, tN ) ∈ H(l,κ1)e (Ksolved)
with κ1 ≤ Ŝl(πk) + Ŝl(πj). .
We apply our induction hypothesis on the set
{Ki|i /∈ {k, j}} and obtain that iw(
⊕
i/∈{k,j}Ri, 0) ∈
H(l,κ2)e (Ksolved) with κ2 ≤
∑
i/∈{k,j} Ŝl(πi). Finally,
using CONG, MOD-I and Lemma 15, we get
iuv(
∑
i/∈{k,j}Ri ⊕ Rk ⊕ Rj↓, 0) ∈ H
(l,κ)
e (Ksolved) with
κ ≤
∑
i Ŝl(πi) which allows to conclude. 
Corollary 1: Let K be a saturated knowledge base. If
ku(R, t) has a derivation tree π ∈ Π′(Ksolved) and kuv(R′, t)
has a derivation tree π′ ∈ Π′(Ksolved) then iuv(R,R′) ∈
H(l,κ)e (Ksolved) with κ ≤ Ŝl(π) + Ŝl(π′).
Proof. If π and π′ ∈ Π′−(Ksolved), we apply Lemma 23 to
get iw(R,R′) ∈ H(l,κ
′)
e (Ksolved) with κ′ ≤ Ŝl(π) + Ŝl(π′).
Otherwise, it is a direct consequence of Lemma 24 applied
on the set of conclusions of extract(π) ∪ extract(π′) and
Lemma 15. 
Lemma 25: If kw(R1, t) ∈ He(Ksolved) and kw(R2, t) ∈
He(Ksolved) then iw(R1, R2) ∈ He(Ksolved)
Proof. By definition of He, there exist kw(R′1, t) ∈
H(Ksolved), kw(R′2, t) ∈ H(Ksolved) such that iw(R1, R′1) ∈
He(Ksolved) and iw(R2, R′2) ∈ He(Ksolved). From Corollary 1,
we got that iw(R′1, R
′
2) ∈ He(Ksolved). Therefore, using
Lemma 15 we derive that iw(R1, R2) ∈ He(Ksolved). 
Proposition 5: If ku(R, t) ∈ He(K) then kuv(R, t) ∈
He(K).
Proof. As ku(R, t) ∈ He(K), it follows that ku(R′, t) ∈
H(K) and iu(R′, R) ∈ He(K) for some R′. By the EXTENDK
rule, we have that kuv(R′, t) ∈ H(K) and by the EXTEND
rule, we have that iuv(R′, R) ∈ He(K). We conclude by
rule EQUATIONAL CONSEQUENCE that kuv(R, t) ∈ He(K),
which is what we had to show. 
Definition 19: Given a term t =
⊕
1≤i≤n ti where no ti is
a sum, then width(t) = n− 1
Lemma 26: Let K be a saturated knowledge base. If
{kw(Ri, ti)|i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} is a set of deduction statements
with derivation trees πi ∈ Π′(Ksolved) then
kw(
⊕
1≤i≤m
Ri,
⊕
1≤i≤m
ti↓) ∈ He(Ksolved).
Proof. We proceed by induction on
∑
1≤i≤mwidth(ti).
Base case. (
⊕
1≤i≤m ti)↓ =
⊕
1≤i≤m ti. We show the base
case by an induction on m. If m = 1 the result is immediate. If
m > 1 then for any pair (j, k), we can build a new derivation
tree of kw(Rj⊕Rk, tj⊕tk) from f+0 , πj and πk. We conclude
by applying our induction hypothesis.
Inductive case. (
⊕
1≤i≤m ti)↓ 6=
⊕
1≤i≤m ti. If there
exists j such that πj ∈ Π′+(Ksolved), then we consider
πa and πb its immediate sub-trees which prove kw(Ra, ta)
and kw(Rb, tb). We conclude by induction hypothesis on the
set where kw(Rj , tj) has been replaced by kw(Ra, ta) and
kw(Rb, tb). Otherwise there exist j, k, πj ∈ Π′−(Ksolved) and
πk ∈ Π′−(Ksolved) such that (tj ⊕ tk)↓ 6= tj ⊕ tk.
• If tj = tk, from Lemma 23, we have
iw(Rj , Rk) ∈ He(Ksolved). From Lemma 15, we
have iw(Rj ⊕ Rk, 0) ∈ He(Ksolved). By REFL we have
iw(
⊕
i/∈{j,k}Ri,
⊕
i/∈{j,k}Ri) ∈ He(Ksolved) and using
the CONG rule we obtain that
iw(
⊕
1≤i≤m
Ri,
⊕
i/∈{j,k}
Ri) ∈ He(Ksolved).
By induction hypothesis, we get
kw(
⊕
i/∈{j,k}
Ri,
⊕
1≤i≤m
ti↓) ∈ He(Ksolved)
and we conclude by EQ. CONS.
• If tj 6= tk, there exist t′, t′j , t′k such that tj =AC t′j ⊕ t′
and tk =AC t′j ⊕ t′. Applying Lemma 21 on the suitable
f ∈ f+1 ∪f
+
2 and the derivation trees πj and πk we obtain
kw(Rj ⊕Rk, tj ⊕ tk↓) ∈ He(Ksolved). From definition of
He, there exists kw(R′, tj⊕tk↓) ∈ H′(Ksolved) of deriva-
tion tree π′ and iw(Rj⊕Rk, R′) ∈ He(Ksolved). By REFL
we have iw(
⊕
i/∈{j,k}Ri,
⊕
i/∈{j,k}Ri) ∈ He(Ksolved)
and using the CONG rule we obtain that
iw(
⊕
1≤i≤m
Ri,
⊕
i/∈{j,k}
Ri ⊕R′) ∈ He(Ksolved).
Since width((tj ⊕ tk)↓) < width(tj) +width(tk), by
induction hypothesis, we get
kw(
⊕
i/∈{j,k}
Ri ⊕R′,
⊕
1≤i≤m
ti↓) ∈ He(Ksolved)
25
and using EQ. CONSEQ. we conclude that
kw(
⊕
1≤i≤m
Ri,
⊕
1≤i≤m
ti↓) ∈ He(Ksolved).

Lemma 27: Let S be a set of seed statements and let
K ∈ sat(Kinit(S)). Then if H ∈ H(S), we have that H ∈
He(Ksolved).
Proof. We prove by induction on the derivation tree of H ∈
H(S) that each node of the derivation tree is in He(Ksolved).
We proceed by case distinction on the last rule that has been
applied to derive H .
Case: EXTENDK. we have that H = kw(R, t) and ku(R, t) ∈
H(S) for some prefix u of w, in which case by the induction
hypothesis we have that ku(R, t) ∈ He(Ksolved) and we
conclude by Proposition 5.
Case: SIMPLE CONSEQUENCE. There is a statement
f =
(
H ′ ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′n
)
∈ S
and a substitution σ grounding for f such that skel(fσ) is in
normal form, H = H ′σ and B′iσ ∈ H(S). By the induction
hypothesis, we have that B′iσ ∈ He(Ksolved). W.l.o.g. assume
that B′i = kw′i(Xi, t
′
i). As B
′
iσ ∈ He(Ksolved), we have by
definition of He that there exist R′i such that
B′′i = kw′iσ(R
′
i, t
′
iσ) ∈ H(Ksolved), (3)
iw′iσ(R
′
i, Xiσ) ∈ He(Ksolved) (4)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and let π′′i be a derivation tree in Π′(Ksolved)
of B′′i .
But w′iσ is a prefix of w, where w is such that H =
predicatew(. . .) with predicate ∈ {r, k}. Note that as S is
a set of seed statements, predicate 6∈ {i, ri}. By applying the
EXTEND rule to Equation (4), we obtain
iw(R
′
i, Xiσ) ∈ He(Ksolved). (5)
Let σ′ be the substitution defined to be σ except that it
maps Xi to R′i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We distinguish several cases
depending on the statement f .
1) Case where f is f+0 , f
+
1 , f
+
2 , f
+
3 or f
+
4 . We conclude
by applying Lemma 26 and rules of He.
2) Case where f is not f+1 , f
+
2 , f
+
3 or f
+
4 .
We will show that H ′σ′ ∈ He(Ksolved). As K was
updated by f , there are three cases:
a) if f ∈ K, we conclude by Lemma 21 or Lemma 17
(depending on the predicate).
b) Otherwise, f⇓ ∈ Ksolved or f⇓ =
(
kw(R, t) ⇐
C1, . . . , Cm
)
and there exists R′ such that(
kw0(R
′, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ conseq(Ksolved)
and such that(
iw0(R↓, R′↓)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ Ksolved.
In this case we conclude by Lemma 20.
We have shown that H ′σ′ ∈ He(Ksolved). We distinguish
several cases depending on predicate:
• predicate = r: In such a case, we have that H ′σ′ = H ′σ =
H and we easily conclude.
• predicate = k: In such a case, we have that H ′σ′ =
kw(Rσ
′, tσ′). Relying on Equation 5 and applying the
rules CONG and REFL, we deduce that: iw(Rσ,Rσ′) ∈
He(Ksolved). Since kw(Rσ′, tσ′) ∈ He(Ksolved) and tσ =
tσ′, using Proposition 4, we conclude that kw(Rσ, tσ) ∈
He(Ksolved). 
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THE ALGORITHM
A. Proof of Lemma 1
A first issue is that Kinit(P ) is infinite. Indeed, the set
seed(P ) for a ground process P is infinite because Npub
contains an infinite set of names.
Lemma 28: Let K ∈ sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub))), we have
that K ∪ ext(K) is a saturated knowledge base.
Proof. First, we have that K ] ext(K) is a knowledge base.
Second, we show that any rule triggered from K ] ext(K) is
either a rule involving two statements of K as premisses (and
thus this has already been done during the saturation of K)
or produces a statement in ext(K).
1) if the rule RESOLUTION is triggered, we have f, g ∈ K.
First, no statement
(
k(m,m) ⇐
)
∈ ext(K) can play
the role of g in the RESOLUTION saturation rule since
t′ = m must unify with t 6∈ X . Therefore t must be m,
but m 6∈ names(K) by hypothesis and therefore t cannot
be m. Second, no statement in ext(K) can play the role
of f in the RESOLUTION saturation rule since they have
no antecedents. Therefore f, g ∈ K.
2) if the rule EQUATION is triggered, we distinguish 3 cases:
a) if a statement
(
k(m,m) ⇐
)
∈ ext(K) plays the
role of f in the EQUATION rule, then we have that
t = m. As t′ unifies with m, we have that either t′ = m
or t′ is a variable. The second case is not possible
since g is well-formed. Therefore t′ = m. As m 6∈
names(K) by hypothesis it follows that g ∈ ext(K)
and therefore g = k(m,m). Therefore the resulting
statement is i(m,m) ∈ ext(K).
b) if a statement
(
k(m,m)⇐
)
∈ ext(K) plays the role
of g, the reasoning is analogous to the case above
c) otherwise f, g ∈ K but since K is saturated this
saturation step has already occurred.
3) if rule TEST triggered, we distinguish two cases:
a) if
(
i(m,m) ⇐
)
∈ ext(K) plays the role of f , then
g = ru ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ∈ K and the result is in ext(K).
b) otherwise f ∈ K. The statement g must also be in K
since g is a reachability statement and ext(K) does not
contain reachability statements. Therefore the rule has
already been applied. 
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We denote by ⇒ one step of the saturation relation, and
by ⇒∗ the transitive closure of ⇒.
Relying on Lemma 28, we are now able to prove Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Let P be a ground process, NPpub ⊆ Npub be
the finite set of public names occurring in P . We have that:
sat(Kinit(P )) ⊇
{K ∪ ext(K) | K ∈ sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub)))}.
where ext(K) is the set containing the following statements:
• kε(n, n)⇐ for any n ∈ Npub rNPpub;
• iε(n, n)⇐ for any n ∈ Npub rNPpub;
• riu(n, n) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn for any ru ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ∈ K
in solved form, any n ∈ Npub rNPpub.
Proof. Let K1 = {kε(n, n) ⇐ | n ∈ Npub r NPpub}. We
have Kinit(P ) = Kinit(seed(P,NPpub))∪K1. We apply satura-
tion and we trigger only saturation rules whose premisses are
not in ext(K). We get:
Kinit(P ) = Kinit(seed(P,NPpub)) ∪K1 ⇒∗ K ∪K1
where K = sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub))). Then we can show that
K∪K1 ⇒∗ K∪ext(K) (we apply the rule EQUATION on the
duplication of each element of K1, then the rule TEST between
each reach statement of K and the obtained identical). Finally,
from Lemma 28, we have that K ∪ ext(K) is saturated. 
B. Correction of the algorithm
In order to prove Theorem 3 we need the following technical
lemmas.
Lemma 29: Let P be a ground process and K ∈
sat(Kinit(P )). Then for any statement f ∈ K, we have that:
1) if f =
(
ril1,...,ln(R,R
′)⇐ {kwi(Xi, ti)}i∈{1,...,m}
)
and
x ∈ vars(lk) then there exists wj = l1, . . . , lk′ with k′ <
k such that x ∈ vars(tj).
2) if f =
(
kl1,...,ln(R, t) ⇐ {kwi(Xi, ti)}i∈{1,...,m}
)
and
x ∈ vars(t) then x ∈ vars(t1, . . . , tm).
Proof. The seed knowledge base satisfies the above proper-
ties and they are preserved by update and saturation. 
Lemma 30: Let P0 be a ground process, ϕ0 = ∅ the empty
frame, and {c1, . . . , ck} names such that ci 6∈ names(P0) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If
(P0, ϕ0)
L1==⇒ (P1, ϕ1)
L2==⇒ . . . Ln==⇒ (Pn, ϕn)
and ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k
• either ci 6∈ names(L1, . . . , Ln)
• or there exist Ri and ti such that ϕidx(ci)−1θ `Ri ti where
θ = {ci 7→ ti}i∈{1,...,k} and idx(ci) = min{j | ci ∈
names(Lj)}
then
(P0, ϕ0)
L1θ
′
===⇒ (P1θ, ϕ1θ)
L2θ
′
===⇒ . . . Lnθ
′
===⇒ (Pnθ, ϕnθ),
where θ′ = {ci 7→ Ri}i∈{1,...,k}.
Proof. By induction on the length n of the derivation. 
Lemma 31: Let P be a ground process, {c1, . . . , ck} be pub-
lic names not occurring in P , θ : {c1, . . . , ck} → T (Σ,N ),
and θ′ : {c1, . . . , ck} → T (Σ,Npub ∪W).
If P |= rw, P |= kw(R, t), and P |= kwθ(ciθ′, ciθ) then
P |= kwθ(Rθ′, tθ).
Proof. Suppose that P |= rwθ. Otherwise the conclusion
trivially follows from the semantics of the k predicate. Let
w = `1 . . . `n.
As P |= rw, we have that (P, ∅)
L1,...,Ln
======⇒ (Q,ϕ) such that
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n it holds that Liϕ↓ =AC `i↓.
As P |= rwθ, we have that (P, ∅)
L′1,...,L
′
n======⇒ (Q′, ϕ′) such
that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n it holds that L′iϕ′↓ =AC `iθ↓.
By induction on n we can show that ϕ′ =AC ϕθ↓. Finally,
we show by induction on R that ϕ `R t and ϕθ `ciθ′ ciθ (for
1 ≤ i ≤ k) implies that ϕθ `Rθ′ tθ. 
Lemma 32: Let P be a ground process and ϕ a frame such
that (P,ϕ)
in(d,R)
====⇒ (P ′, ϕ′). Let R′ be such that (R = R′)ϕ.
Then we have that (P,ϕ)
in(d,R′)
=====⇒ (P ′, ϕ′).
Proof. R and R′ are recipes for the same term in ϕ and
therefore the transition still holds. 
Theorem 3: Let P be a ground process, and NPpub ⊆ Npub
be the finite set of public names occurring in P . Let P be a
protocol, and K0 ∈ sat(Kinit(seed(P,NPpub))). We have that:
• if P v P then REACH-IDENTITY(K0solved,P) holds;
• if P is determinate and REACH-IDENTITY(K0solved,P)
holds then P v P .
Proof. Let K ∈ sat(Kinit(P )). By Lemma 1, we have that
Ksolved = K
0
solved ∪KR for some KR as defined in Lemma 1.
We first prove that if REACH-IDENTITY fails then P 6v P . In
such a case, we have that(
ril1,...,ln(R,R
′)⇐ {kwi(Xi, xi)}i∈{1,...,m}
)
∈ K0solved
1) either (P, ∅) 6 M1,...,Mn======⇒ (P ′, ϕ) for any (P ′, ϕ). How-
ever, by Theorem 2 (soundness of Ksolved and thus of
K0solved), we have that there exists (P
′′, ϕ′′) such that
(P, ∅) M1,...,Mn−−−−−−→ (P ′′, ϕ′′). Hence, we have that P 6v P .
2) or for any (P ′, ϕ) such that (P, ∅) M1,...,Mn======⇒ (P ′, ϕ) and
any grounding substitution ω we have that Rωϕ↓ 6=AC
R′ωϕ↓. By Theorem 2, we have that there exists (P ′′, ϕ′′)
such that (P, ∅) M1,...,Mn−−−−−−→ (P ′′, ϕ′′) and Rωϕ′′↓ =AC
R′ωϕ′′↓. Hence, we have that P 6v P .
Next, we prove that if P 6v P and P determinate, then
REACH-IDENTITY fails. We assume that P 6v P , and that
REACH-IDENTITY holds, and we derive a contradiction. As
P 6v P , it follows that there exist L1, . . . , Ln, and ϕ such
that (P, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (P ′, ϕ) and (R =E R′)ϕ, and
1) either (P, ∅) 6 L1,...,Ln======⇒ (Q′, ψ) for any (Q′, ψ);
2) or (R 6=E R′)ψ where ψ is the frame reached by P after
the execution of L1, . . . .Ln.
We consider such a witness of minimal length. Note that,
since P is determinate, even if such a frame ψ is not unique,
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they all satisfy the same tests. Note also that we can w.l.o.g.
consider that at least one test holds in P ′ (possibly considering
a trivial one, i.e. 0 = 0).
As (P, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (Pn, ϕn) = (P ′, ϕ) and (R =E R′)ϕn,
by completeness, we have that:
iL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓(R,R
′) ∈ He(Ksolved).
In the second case, we also have that (R 6=E R′)ψ. From
the fact that iL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓(R,R
′) ∈ He(Ksolved) and (R 6=E
R′)ψ, we can show that there exist recipes RA, R′A and k ≤ n
such that iL1ϕn↓,...,Lkϕn↓(RA, R
′
A) ∈ H(Ksolved) but (RA 6=
R′A)ψ. Actually, we have that k = n in order to not contradict
the minimality of n.
We now choose among all the minimal witnesses (w.r.t. the
length) of non-inclusion, one such that Ŝn(π) is minimal too.
More formally, we consider a witness of non-inclusion such
that (n, Ŝn(π)) is minimal (with a lexical order) where n is the
length of the witness and π is the derivation tree in Π′(Ksolved)
of iL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓(RA, R
′
A).
We denote by πm the derivation tree of such a minimal
witness iL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓(RA, R
′
A) ∈ H(Ksolved).
In the first case (item 1), we simply have to consider a
witness of non-inclusion of minimal length, and we may
assume that RA = R′A = 0 (in which case its derivation
tree πm has size Ŝn(πm) = 0), and of course, we do not have
that (RA 6= R′A)ψ. Now, considering such a minimal witness,
we have that:
(P, ∅) L1−−→ (P1, ϕ1)
L2−−→ . . . (Pn−1, ϕn−1)
Ln−−→ (Pn, ϕn)
By Theorem 2 (completeness), we know that:
rL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓ ∈ He(Ksolved).
By the definition ofHe, we have that it contains no reachability
statement in addition to those in H. Therefore, we have that:
• rL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓ ∈ H(Ksolved), and
• iL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓(RA, R
′
A) ∈ H(Ksolved).
Thanks to Lemma 22, we deduce that:
riL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(RA, R
′
A) ∈ H(n,Ŝn(πm))e (Ksolved).
Therefore there exists a statement
f =
(
ril1,...,ln(RB , R
′
B)⇐ {kwi(Xi, xi)}i∈{1,...,m}
)
∈ Ksolved
and a substitution τ grounding for f such that:
• kwiτ (Xiτ, xiτ) ∈ H(Ksolved) of derivation tree πi (for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m),
• l1τ, . . . , lnτ = L1ϕn↓, . . . , Lnϕn↓, and
• RBτ↓ = RA↓, and R′Bτ↓ = R′A↓.
Due to the shape of f (note that (RB , R′B) 6= (n, n) for any
public name n), we have that f ∈ K0solved. We suppose w.l.o.g.
that i ≤ j implies wi v wj for f .
We also build another substitution β as follows: for each
1 ≤ i ≤ m, consider the set compi = { j |xj = xi }. Consider
the map least : { 1 ≤ i ≤ m } → { 1 ≤ i ≤ m } defined as
least(i) = xr where r = min{j | wj ∈ compi}. Finally β is
the substitution such that β(Xi) = Xleast(i).
Let c1, . . . , ck be fresh public names and let
σ : vars(l1, . . . , ln) ∪ {x1, . . . , xm} → {c1, . . . , ck}
be a bijection of inverse σ−1. We have that:
• k(cj , cj)⇐ ∈ Kinit(P ) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k;
• kwiσ(Xiσ
′, xiσ) ∈ H(Ksolved) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
where dom(σ′) = {X1, . . . , Xm} and σ′(Xi) = xiσ for all
1 ≤ i ≤ m. We also define the mapping σ′−1 to be such
that dom(σ′−1) = {c1, . . . , ck} and σ′−1(ci) = Xj where j
is such that σ′(Xj) = ci and Xjβ = Xj . Instantiating f with
σ ∪ σ′, we obtain that
ril1σ,...,lnσ(RBσ
′, R′Bσ
′) ∈ H(Ksolved).
By Theorem 2 (soundness), P |= ril1σ,...,lnσ(RBσ′, R′Bσ′).
Therefore, there exist recipes R′i (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n such
that li = in(di, ti)) such that P |= kl1σ,...,li−1σ(R′i, tiσ). By
Theorem 2 (completeness) and definition of He there exist
recipes Ri such that kl1σ,...,li−1σ(Ri, tiσ) ∈ H(Ksolved), and
il1σ,...,li−1σ(Ri, R
′
i) ∈ He(Ksolved).
Let Mi = li if li ∈ {test, out(c) | c ∈ Ch} and let Mi =
in(di, R′′i ) if li = in(di, ti) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n where the recipes
R′′i correspond to those computed during the algorithm. As
REACH-IDENTITY(Ksolved,P) holds there exists Q′0 ∈ P such
that
(Q′0, ψ
′
0)
M1==⇒ (Q′1, ψ′1)
M2==⇒ . . . Mn==⇒ (Q′n, ψ′n)
where ψ′0 = ∅.
Let i be such that li = in(di, ti). Applying Lemma 29
to f we have that for all x ∈ vars(ti) there exists
wj such that |wj | < i and x = xj . We have that
kwjτ (Xjτ, xjτ) ∈ H(Ksolved), and kwjτ (Xjβτ, xjτ) ∈
H(Ksolved) by choice of f , τ and β. By Theorem 2 (sound-
ness), we obtain that P |= kwjτ (Xjβτ, xjτ). Hence, as
|wj | < i, P |= kl1τ,...,li−1τ (Xjβτ, xjτ). We rewrite it as
P |= kl1σσ−1τ,...,li−1σ(σ−1τ)(Xjβσ′(σ′−1τ), xjσ(σ−1τ)). We
already established that P |= rl1σ,...,lnσ , and we know that
kl1σ,...,li−1σ(Ri, tiσ) ∈ H(Ksolved) and therefore by Theo-
rem 2 (soundness) we have that P |= kl1σ,...,li−1σ(Ri, tiσ).
We apply Lemma 31 to obtain that
P |= kl1τ,...,li−1τ (Riσ′−1τ, tiτ). (6)
Now, we consider θ a mapping with dom(θ) = {c1, . . . , ck}
such that θ = θn and θi is defined as:
• θ0 is the identity function; and
• θj(ci) = σ
′−1τ(ci)ψ
′
idx(ci)−1θ
j−1 where 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
dom(θj) = {ci | idx(ci) ≤ j} and where idx(ci) =
min{k | ci ∈ names(Mk)}.
By applying Lemma 30 inductively on n we have that
(Q′0, ψ
′
0) = (Q
′
0θ, ψ0θ)
M1σ
′−1τ
======⇒ (Q′1θ, ψ′1θ)
M2σ
′−1τ
======⇒
. . .
Mnσ
′−1τ
======⇒ (Q′nθ, ψ′nθ).
Now we show by induction on n that
(Q′0θ, ψ0θ)
L1==⇒ (Q′1θ, ψ′1θ)
L2==⇒ . . . Ln==⇒ (Qnθ, ψ′nθ).
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We assume by the induction hypothesis that
(Q′0θ, ψ0θ)
L1==⇒ (Q′1θ, ψ′1θ)
L2==⇒ . . . Li−1===⇒ (Q′i−1θ, ψ′i−1θ)
and we show that
(Q′i−1θ, ψ
′
i−1θ)
Li=⇒ (Q′iθ, ψ′iθ).
We will show that Li and Miσ′−1τ satisfy the conditions
of Lemma 32 which allows us to conclude. Indeed, either
Li = Miσ
′−1τ (in the case of a test or out action), or
Li = in(di, R′′i ) and Miσ′−1τ = in(di, Riσ′−1τ) (in the case
of a in action). In the second case, we need to show that
(Riσ
′−1τ = R′′i )(ψ
′
i−1θ). By the definition of |=, we have
that P |= kl1τ,...,li−1τ (R′′i , tiτ). We have previously shown
in (6) that P |= kl1τ,...,li−1τ (Riσ′−1τ, tiτ) and therefore
P |= il1τ,...,li−1τ (Riσ′−1τ,R′′i ), or, equivalently, (Riσ′−1τ =
R′′i )ϕi−1. By the hypothesis, we have that there exists Q ∈ P
such that
(Q, ∅) L1==⇒ (Q1, ψ1)
L2==⇒ . . . Li−1===⇒ (Qi−1, ψi−1),
and (Riσ′−1τ = R′′i )ψi−1. By determinacy of Q it follows
that ψi−1 ≈s ψ′i−1θ and therefore (Riσ′−1τ = R′′i )ψ′i−1θ as
well. As the hypothesis of Lemma 32 are satisfied, we can
conclude.
We have shown that (P, ∅) L1,...,Ln======⇒ (Q′nθ, ψ′nθ), therefore
the Hypothesis 1 cannot hold.
We know show that Hypothesis 2 can not hold too.
As the equational theory is stable by substitution of terms
for names and we know that (RBσ′ =E R′Bσ
′)ψ′n, we deduce
that [(RBσ′σ′−1τ =E R′Bσ
′σ′−1τ)ψ′n]θ.
We claim that (RBσ′ψ′n)θ = (RBβτ)(ψ
′
nθ). The proof is
by induction on the size of RB . The only interesting case is
the case when RB is Xi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In this case,
we have that (RBσ′ψ′n)θ = cjθ where cj = σ(xi).
By construction of θ, cjθ = τ ◦ σ′−1(cj)(ψ′nθ) and
τ ◦ σ′−1(cj) is (by construction) Xiβτ . Hence we get that
(Xiσ
′ψ′n)θ = (Xiβτ)(ψ
′
nθ). Similarly, we can show that
(R′Bσ
′ψ′n)θ = (R
′
Bβτ)(ψ
′
nθ). Hence,
(RBβτ)(ψ
′
nθ) =E (R
′
Bβτ)(ψ
′
nθ).
Now, thanks to determinacy, we have that (R′Bβτ =E
R′Bβτ)ψ where ψ is the frame (up to static equivalence)
reached by P after L1, . . . , Ln.
We now show that:
(RBβτ =E R
′
Bβτ)ψ implies (RBτ =E R
′
Bτ)ψ.
Going back to the statement f , we consider all pairs (i, j)
such that xi = xj . We show that (Xiτ =E Xjτ)ψ. We
distinguish three cases:
1) Case: W(πi) < n and W(πj) < n. In such a case,
from Corollary 1, we have iL1ϕn↓,...,Lkϕn↓(Xiτ,Xjτ) ∈
H(k,κ)e (Ksolved) for some k < n and κ. Hence we have
(Xiτ =E Xjτ)ϕk By minimality of n we also have that
(Xiτ =E Xjτ)ψ.
2) Case: W(πi) = n and W(πj) = n. In such a case,
from Corollary 1, we have iL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓(Xiτ,Xjτ) ∈
H(n,κ
′)
e (Ksolved) with κ′ ≤ Ŝn(πi) + Ŝn(πj). Hence we
have (Xiτ =E Xjτ)ϕ. Since Ŝn(πi) ≤ S(πi) − 1 (the
root node is not counted) and S(πi) +S(πj) ≤ Ŝn(πm),
we have κ′ < Ŝn(πm). By minimality of our witness, we
also have that (Xiτ =E Xjτ)ψ.
3) Case W(πi) = n and W(πj) < n. In such a case,
from Corollary 1, we have iL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓(Xiτ,Xjτ) ∈
H(n,κ
′)
e (Ksolved) with κ′ ≤ Ŝn(πi) since Ŝn(πj) = 0.
Hence we have (Xiτ =E Xjτ)ϕ. Since Ŝn(πi) ≤
S(πi) − 1 (the root node is not counted) and S(πi) ≤
Ŝn(πm), we have κ′ < Ŝn(πm). By minimality of our
witness, we also have that (Xiτ =E Xjτ)ψ.
From the above equalities, we have that
• (RBτ =E RBβτ)ψ,
• (R′Bτ =E R
′
Bβτ)ψ,
Therefore, we get (RBτ =E R′Bτ)ψ and hence (RA =E
R′A)ψ, thus obtaining a contradiction.
As both cases yield a contradiction, it follows that if P 6v P
then REACH-IDENTITY(K0solved,P) fails. 
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